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Through innovation or a "flash of creative genius,"' an in-
ventor creates something new and useful that is not obvious
from existing inventions. Imagine that this inventor-or her
employer in many cases-decides to invest money and time in
researching and developing the new invention. Eventually, after
she determines that the invention will work, she invests even
more money to file a patent application with the US Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). After a series of negotiations with a
PTO patent examiner, which can take years, the examiner
grants the inventor a patent on her invention. Just when she is
primed to reap the fruits of her labor, a competitor swoops in,
uses her invention, and begins profiting from it without permis-
sion. In response, the inventor turns to patent law, which she
believes gives her the right to preclude others from using her in-
vention.2 Yet, much to her dismay, she has no recourse against
this competitor because the competitor is not acting alone. Un-
der existing law, when multiple entities jointly make, use, or sell
every element of a patented invention as a group-but no single
entity does so alone-none of the entities has infringed the
patent.3
t BS 2004, Spelman College; SM 2008, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; JD
Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Cuno Engineering Corp v Automatic Devices Corp, 314 US 84, 91 (1941).
2 See 35 USC § 154(a)(1) ("[A] patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention.").
3 See Limelight Networks, Inc v Akamai Technologies, Inc, 134 S Ct 2111, 2118
(2014) ("[P]erformance of all the claimed steps cannot be attributed to a single person, so
direct infringement never occurred."); Muniauction, Inc v Thomson Corp, 532 F3d 1318,
1329 (Fed Cir 2008) ("[D]irect infringement requires a single party to perform every step
of a claimed method.").
1023
The University of Chicago Law Review
This loophole has been termed "joint patent infringement"
or "divided patent infringement."4 Joint infringers have been
able to circumvent the federal patent statute because courts
have held that a single entity must individually make, use, or
sell each and every element of a patented invention to infringe a
patent. 5
In Limelight Networks, Inc v Akamai Technologies, Inc,6 the
US Supreme Court grappled with the issue of joint patent in-
fringement.7 Akamai Technologies sued its competitor, Lime-
light Networks, for infringing its patent covering a method for
delivering Web content. 8 The patented method included (1) des-
ignating or "tagging" content-such as music or video files-and
(2) storing that content on servers accessed by Internet users. 9
Limelight performed some of Akamai's patented method steps
but relied on other parties to complete the remaining step.10
Specifically, Limelight stored the content providers' content on a
server but instructed its customers to designate the content
themselves." By dividing the patented steps among multiple
parties, Limelight shielded itself from patent infringement lia-
bility.12 This left the patent owner with no remedy under federal
patent law, even though the joint conduct harmed the owner to
the same degree as infringement by a single entity would have.
This result presents a conundrum. On the one hand, the law
explicitly rules out holding joint infringers liable for patent in-
fringement if no individual actor makes, uses, or sells every el-
ement of a patented invention. On the other hand, strong policy
considerations recommend the opposite outcome-joint infring-
ers should not be able to avoid liability simply by working as a
group. In fact, even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
its interpretation of the patent statute "permit[s] a would-be in-
fringer to evade liability by dividing performance of a method
patent's steps with another whom the defendant neither directs
4 See, for example, Mathew Lowrie, Kevin M. Littman, and Lucas Silva, The
Changing Landscape of Joint, Divided and Indirect Infringement-The State of the Law
and How to Address It, 12 J High Tech L 65, 65 (2011).
5 See, for example, BMC Resources, Inc v Paymentech, LP, 498 F3d 1373, 1380
(Fed Cir 2007).
6 134 S Ct 2111 (2014) ("Limelight").
7 Id at 2120.
8 Id at 2115-16.
9 Idat 2115.
10 Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2115.
11 Id.
12 Id at 2119.
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nor controls."13 Although the Court characterized that result as
an "anomaly," it ultimately declined to resolve the issue.14 Yet
there is a solution to the joint-infringement conundrum not yet con-
sidered by any court or commentator: joint patent misappropriation.
This Comment argues that state courts can and should ap-
ply the misappropriation doctrine to resolve the joint-
infringement problem. To reach that conclusion, this Comment
proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the elements of various
patent infringement claims. It then explores an important ele-
ment of patent law that influences the joint patent infringement
problem-namely, the single-entity rule. Part II illustrates the
joint patent infringement problem and then problematizes pre-
viously proposed solutions to it. Finally, Part III describes the
joint-patent-misappropriation claim in detail and considers how
it would work in practice. Part III also examines the claim's via-
bility as a solution to joint patent infringement, concluding that,
although the joint-patent-misappropriation approach is imper-
fect, it is still a powerful solution to a significant problem.
I. PATENT INFRINGEMENT
This Part overviews the types of patent infringement claims
that are available under 35 USC § 271. In addition, it introduces
the single-entity rule and explores that rule's origin and pur-
pose. Finally, it presents and explains the rule's sole exception-
the direct-and-control standard.
Article I, § 8 of the US Constitution authorizes Congress to
grant patent rights to inventors in exchange for full public dis-
closure of their inventions. 15 A patent is a federal intellectual
property right that permits patent owners to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the patented invention for twenty
years. 16 Notably, patented inventions and patents are not neces-
sarily the same thing. Patents include a specification, at least
one claim, and oftentimes drawings. 17 Patented inventions, how-
ever, are defined only by patent claims, which are single sen-
tences that may be much broader than the actual product or
13 Id at 2120.
14 Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2120.
15 US Const Art I, § 8, cls 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
16 See 35 USC § 154(a)(1)-(2).
17 See 35 USC § 111(a).
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method described in the corresponding patent.1 8 Put another
way, the patent claims, not the entire patent, define the metes
and bounds of the property right.'9 Patent owners typically en-
force these rights by suing for patent infringement. Title 35 of
the US Code contains the main body of patent law, and § 271
governs patent infringement. Specifically, § 271 covers direct
and indirect infringement. The latter can take two forms-
induced and contributory infringement. The following para-
graphs discuss each infringement category in turn.
A. Direct Infringement
Direct patent infringement is the most common type of pa-
tent infringement.20 Under § 271(a), a party is liable for direct
patent infringement if it "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" an-
other's patented invention within the United States without au-
thorization.21 In Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Re-
placement Co,22 the Supreme Court declared that a party is not
liable for direct patent infringement unless it performs each and
every element or step of a patent claim.23 This declaration is
known as the "all-elements rule."24
Almost fifty years later in BMC Resources, Inc v Paymentech,
LP,25 the Federal Circuit explicitly acknowledged another rule, the
single-entity rule, which states that direct infringement requires
that a single entity perform each and every element of a patent
claim.26 In that case, BMC accused Paymentech, a third-party pro-
cesser of consumer financial transactions, of infringing BMC's
18 See Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 US 370, 373 (1996), quoting 35
USC § 112 ("[A] patent includes one or more 'claims,' which 'particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."')
(brackets omitted).
19 See In re Hiniker, 150 F3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed Cir 1998).
20 See Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60
Am U L Rev 1575, 1576 (2011).
21 35 USC § 271(a).
22 365 US 336 (1961) ("Aro I").
23 Id at 340, quoting Mercoid Corp v Mid-Continent Co, 320 US 661, 667 (1944)
('The patent is for a combination only. Since none of the separate elements of the combi-
nation is claimed as the invention, none of them when dealt with separately is protected
by the patent monopoly.").
24 See, for example, Global Patent Holdings, LLC v Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F
Supp 2d 1331, 1334 (SD Fla 2008), quoting Canton Bio-Medical, Inc v Integrated Liner
Technologies, Inc, 216 F3d 1367, 1370 (Fed Cir 2000). The Supreme Court recently af-
firmed the all-elements rule in Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2117.
25 498 F3d 1373 (Fed Cir 2007) ("BMC").
26 See id at 1380.
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patent on a method for processing debit transactions without a
personal identification number.27 Paymentech denied infringing
the patent on the ground that it did not perform each and every
step of the patent claim-its customers performed some of
them.28 The BMC court agreed with Paymentech's argument and
held that Paymentech did not infringe the patent at issue.29
Some courts, however, have noted that the single-entity rule
"severely limits the protection provided for patents which would
otherwise be valid and enforceable. 30 While that may be true,
the single-entity rule plays a crucial role in patent law and poli-
cy. Indeed, without the rule, an entity that performs part of a
patented method-not knowing that another entity has or will
perform the remaining portion-could be held liable for direct
patent infringement, as direct infringement is a strict-liability
offense.31 In short, the single-entity rule protects parties that did
not themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute in-
fringement and had no way of knowing that the acts of others
would cause their collective conduct to infringe a patent.32
To comprehend the full weight of the single-entity rule, it is
necessary to ascertain its origin and scope. Thus, this Comment
now turns to a discussion of the potential sources of the single-
entity rule and then examines its sole exception.
1. The origin of the single-entity rule.
Although there is virtually no disagreement about the ra-
tionale for the single-entity rule, its origin is disputed. The Su-
preme Court recently declared-and some Federal Circuit judg-
es have agreed-that the single-entity rule is "Federal Circuit
case law."33 Other judges have disagreed, attributing the rule to
27 Id at 1375-76.
28 Id at 1377.
29 BMC, 498 F3d at 1380.
30 McKesson Information Solutions LLC v Epic Systems Corp, 2009 WL 2915778, *7
(ND Ga). Judge Moore argued that the rule creates a "gaping hole" in patent infringe-
ment liability. See Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 2015 WL
2216261, *11 (Fed Cir) (Moore dissenting).
31 See Akamai Technologies, 2015 WL 2216261 at *9 (contemplating the extraordi-
nary possibility that consumers could be liable "even without knowing of the patent");
BMC, 498 F3d at 1381 ("Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense, but it is limited
to those who practice each and every element of the claimed invention.").
32 See Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 692 F3d 1301, 1307
(Fed Cir 2012) ("Akamai").
33 Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2113. See also Akamai, 692 F3d at 1308.
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the Supreme Court. Still others have noted a possible statutory
source. Each of these perspectives is discussed below.
Then-chief judge Randall Rader and Judges Alan Lourie,
William Bryson, Kimberly Moore, Jimmie Reyna, and Evan Wal-
lach of the Federal Circuit have suggested that Fromson v Ad-
vance Offset Plate, Inc 34 provides one of the earliest declarations
of the single-entity rule.35 Fromson owned a patent on the pro-
cess of making a sensitized photographic plate, and Advance
practiced all but one element of the patent-Advance did not it-
self apply a diazo coating or other light-sensitive layer to the
plate.36 Instead, Advance's customers applied the diazo coating3 7
For that reason, the court held that Advance could not be liable
for direct infringement.38
Judges Richard Linn, Timothy Dyk, Sharon Prost, and
Kathleen O'Malley, however, have refuted the notion that the
Federal Circuit introduced the single-entity rule in Fromson.39
Instead, they have proposed that the Supreme Court introduced
the single-entity rule in its 1961 Aro I decision.40 Specifically,
Linn's dissent in Akamai cited Aro I for the proposition that
"[d]irect infringement liability requires that one actor performs
each and every element or step of a claim."41 The Aro I Court did
note that direct infringement requires a showing that the pur-
chaser himself infringed the patent42--and the term "himself'
could be interpreted to suggest only one person. Despite Aro I,
the Supreme Court has attributed the single-entity rule to the
Federal Circuit. 43
There is a third possible source of the single-entity rule: the
Patent Act. Section 271(a) states that "whoever without authori-
ty [] uses ... any patented invention ... infringes the patent."
Many Federal Circuit judges have suggested that the term
"whoever" in § 271(a) denotes a single entity. 44 Judge Pauline
34 720 F2d 1565 (Fed Cir 1983).
35 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1305, 1307.
36 Fromson, 720 F2d at 1567-68.
37 Id.
38 Id at 1568.
39 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1337, 1342 (Linn dissenting).
40 See id at 1347 (Linn dissenting).
41 Id (Linn dissenting) (emphasis added), citing Aro I, 365 US at 340.
42 See Aro I, 365 US at 341.
43 See Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2120.
44 See, for example, Akamai, 692 F3d at 1307 ("[T]he accused infringer must per-
form all the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through another acting
under his direction or control."); id at 1347-48 (Linn dissenting) ("[W]here a single entity
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Newman, however, has disagreed with this view; she argued in
her Akamai dissent that joint patent infringement constitutes
direct patent infringement under § 271(a) because "[d]irect in-
fringement may be by more than one entity. 45 Specifically, she
argued that the term "whoever" in § 271(a) "embraces the singu-
lar and plural" and therefore "does not support the single-entity
rule."46 Rejecting Newman's view, Linn explained:
[Newman's] argument fails for two reasons. First, if one in-
terprets "whoever" to include the plural, the statute simply
states the obvious: More than one entity can be inde-
pendently liable for direct patent infringement if each entity
practices every element of the claim. Second, the statutory
context, with § 271(b) and (c) extending liability to actors
who do not independently infringe ... [,] indicates that
§ 271(a) excludes joint liability. 47
Thus, according to Linn, courts should not construe § 271(a) to
cover joint activity.
While Fromson, Aro I, and the Patent Act likely all influ-
enced the firm establishment of the single-entity rule, the
broader single-entity concept predated the Federal Circuit's es-
tablishment in 1982, the 1964 Aro I case, and the Patent Act's
enactment in 1952. Indeed, the concept extends back to the
common law, the relevant principles of which the patent statute
aimed to codify.48 For example, in the 1875 case Saxe v
Hammond,49 the plaintiff owned a patent on musical instru-
ments with a fan-tremolo.5 The defendants made fan-tremolos
according to the patent but sold them to organ manufacturers
that completed the remaining element of the patent claim-
placing the fans in musical instruments.51 Because no single
party combined all the separate elements of the claim without
does not perform each and every claim limitation, that entity may not be characterized
as or held liable as a direct infringer.").
45 Id at 1322 (Newman dissenting).
46 Id (Newman dissenting). Moore recently adopted this view. See Akamai Technol-
ogies, 2015 WL 2216261 at *16 (Moore dissenting) (explaining that "whoever" encom-
passes multiple entities).
47 Id at 1348 (Linn dissenting) (emphasis added).
48 See Nathaniel Grow, Joint Patent Infringement following Akamai, 51 Am Bus L
J 71, 77-80 (2014) (noting that Congress codified common-law principles of trespass in-
fringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability in § 271).
49 21 F Cases 593 (CCD Mass 1875).
50 Id at 593-94.
51 Id at 594.
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authorization, the court held that the defendants had not in-
fringed the patent-directly or indirectly.52 In other words, no
infringement by a single party meant no infringement at all.
Despite the existence of the single-entity concept in the
common law and its plausible basis in the Patent Act and Aro I,
no court explicitly articulated the principle until the Federal
Circuit's 2007 decision in BMC.53 Indeed, Mobil Oil Corp v Fil-
trol Corp54-decided in 1974, after Aro I and after Congress en-
acted the Patent Act, but before Congress created the Federal
Circuit-illustrates this point. In Mobil Oil, the Ninth Circuit
failed to acknowledge the single-entity rule, noting that the
court "question[ed] whether a method claim [could] be infringed
when two separate entities perform[ed] different operations and
neither [had] control of the other's activities."55 The court then
added that "[no case in point [had] been cited,"56 which suggests
that the single-entity rule was not then prevalent.
To summarize, while it is difficult to pinpoint the origin of
the single-entity rule, the rule's existence became undeniable af-
ter BMC, when the Federal Circuit not only acknowledged the
single-entity rule but also created an exception to it.
2. The exception to the single-entity rule: the direct-and-
control standard.
The BMC court created an exception to the single-entity
rule that derives from the agency principle of vicarious liability:
the direct-and-control standard. 51 The exception states that
when a party directs or controls the infringing behavior of its
agent, the directing principal is liable for direct infringement
under § 271(a).58 Simply put, a party cannot avoid direct
52 Id ("A patent is valid for a new combination of old elements. A person who uses one
or more of the old elements is not an infringer, unless he uses the new combination.).
53 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1380 (stating that "the traditional standard requir[es] a
single party to perform all steps of a claimed method").
54 501 F2d 282 (9th Cir 1974).
55 Id at 291-92.
56 Id at 292.
57 Earlier patent cases recognized a looser standard as an exception to the single-
entity rule. See Part II.B.3.
58 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1381 (requiring direction or control for a finding of joint
infringement); Centillion Data Systems, LLC v Qwest Communications International,
Inc, 631 F3d 1279, 1284 (Fed Cir 2011) ("[T]o 'use' a system for purposes of infringement,
a party must ... control the system as a whole."); Muniauction, Inc v Thomson Corp, 532
F3d 1318, 1329 (Fed Cir 2008) ("[W]here the actions of multiple parties combine to per-
form every step of a claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party
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infringement merely by having someone else perform one or
more of the claimed steps on its behalf.59 For example, in TGIP,
Inc v AT&T Corp,60 the court considered patents that TGIP
owned on a prepaid-calling card system that allowed customers
to purchase calling cards and recharge them.61 TGIP asserted
that AT&T had directly infringed its patents, but AT&T con-
tended that it had not infringed the patents because other com-
panies provided the data terminals and activation platforms
necessary to practice the patent. 62 In other words, AT&T argued
that it did not perform each and every element of the patent
claim on its own. The TGIP court determined, however, that the
jury was right to find that AT&T had directly infringed TGIP's
patent because there was sufficient evidence in the record that
AT&T "controlled or directed" the other companies to perform
the remaining elements of the patent.63
The Federal Circuit most recently refined its position on the
direct-and-control standard in Muniauction, Inc v Thomson
Corp,64 although the court did not find an agency relationship in
that case.65 Muniauction accused Thomson of directly infringing
its patent, which covered original-issuer-municipal-bond auc-
tions conducted over the Internet using a Web browser.66 But
Thomson was not a single party performing every step of the as-
serted claims. While Thomson's electronic auctioneer system
performed most of the steps, Thomson instructed individual bid-
ders to perform the remaining input step.67 Because Thomson
did not "control or direct[ ]" the entire process, the court held
that Thomson's actions did not warrant liability for direct
infringement.68
The direct-and-control standard is satisfied in situations in
which the law would traditionally hold the accused party
exercises 'control or direction' over the entire process such that every step is attributable
to the controlling party, i.e., the 'mastermind."').
59 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1379.
60 527 F Supp 2d 561 (ED Tex 2007).
61 Id at 568-69.
62 Id at 577. See also Keith Jaasma, Finding the Patent Infringement Master-
mind" The "Control or Direction" Standard for "Joint" Infringement, 26 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech L J 411, 437 (2010).
63 TGIP, 527 F Supp 2d at 578.
64 532 F3d 1318 (Fed Cir 2008).
65 See id at 1329-30.
66 Id at 1321.
67 Id at 1328-29.
68 Muniauction, 532 F3d at 1330.
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vicariously liable for another party's unlawful conduct.69 Specific
actions that qualify as direction or control include: (1) contract-
ing out the steps of a patented process, 70 (2) employing an agent
to infringe a patent,71 and (3) otherwise causing performance of
each and every patent step.72 However, the plaintiffs in Akamai,
the plaintiff in BMC, and several commentators have argued
that the direct-and-control standard is too narrow an exception
to the single-entity rule.73 Indeed, in a recent amicus brief sub-
mitted to the Federal Circuit, several companies asserted that
"[i]t is time for this Court to ... apply a flexible rule that recog-
nizes situations, in addition to when one party is under the di-
rection or control of another, where entities acting in concert can
be held responsible for direct infringement."74 But the Federal
Circuit declined to do so, reiterating that "direct infringement lia-
bility of a method claim under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) exists when all
the steps of the claim are performed by or attributed to a single
entity-as would be the case ... in a principle-agent relationship,
in a contractual arrangement, or in a joint enterprise. 75
69 See Centillion, 631 F3d at 1288 (holding that the defendant was not vicariously
liable for its customers' actions when it in no way directed them to perform the remain-
ing elements of the patented invention); Muniauction, 532 F3d at 1330 (holding that the
fact that the defendant controlled access to its system and instructed bidders on the sys-
tem's use did not suffice to create liability for direct infringement); Crowell v Baker Oil
Tools, 143 F2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir 1944) ("It is obvious that one may infringe a patent if
he employs an agent for that purpose or have [sic] the offending articles manufactured
for him by an independent contractor."). See also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01
(2006) (defining "agency" as the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person, the
agent, willingly acts on behalf of another person, the principal, subject to the principal's
assent and control).
70 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1381.
71 See Crowell, 143 F2d at 1004.
72 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1382.
73 See Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2120 (noting that Akamai criticized the Court's ap-
proach for allowing "would-be infringer[s] to evade liability by dividing performance of a
method patent's steps with another whom the defendant neither directs nor controls");
BMC, 498 F3d at 1379-80 (noting that BMC argued that the court should expand its di-
rect-or-control standard to a "participation and combined action" standard). See also, for
example, Stacie L. Greskowiak, Note, Joint Infringement after BMC: The Demise of Pro-
cess Patents, 41 Loyola U Chi L J 351, 393 (2010) ("The Federal Circuit erred in reason-
ing that permitting joint infringement liability without a finding of 'direction or control'
would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement.").
74 Brief of Amici Curiae Double Rock Corporation, Island Intellectual Property,
LLC and Broadband iTV, Inc in Support of the Statement Requesting Continued En
Banc Review, Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, Nos 2009-1372,
2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417, *3 (Fed Cir filed June 20, 2014) (available on Westlaw
at 2014 WL 3586013).
75 Akamai Technologies, 2015 WL 2216261 at *1.
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In Limelight, the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibil-
ity that the direct-and-control standard, which it termed "the
Muniauction rule,"76 may interpret § 271(a)'s scope too narrow-
ly.77 Some commentators have construed this acknowledgement
as the Court disapproving of the Muniauction rule78 Yet the
Court refused to address the direct-infringement issue head-on,
despite Akamai's urging.79 Consequently, others could argue
that this refusal suggests that the Court finds no fault with the
Muniauction rule. In short, because the Court refused to explic-
itly address the direct-infringement issue, it is unclear whether
the Court approves or disapproves of the Muniauction rule.
Under existing patent law, satisfying the direct-and-control
standard is the only way for a party that does not itself perform
each and every element of a patent claim to be held liable for di-
rect infringement. And in the provider-user context, meeting
this standard is rare.80 Indeed, most cases of multiparty in-
fringement are governed by indirect patent infringement doc-
trines.81 It is these doctrines-induced and contributory in-
fringement-to which this Comment now turns.
B. Induced Infringement
Under § 271(b), a party is liable for induced patent in-
fringement if it "actively induces" infringement of a patent. A
party actively induces if it takes affirmative steps to lead, influ-
ence, or persuade others to engage in conduct that amounts to
76 Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2119.
77 See id. Note that the Court acknowledged that Muniauction was the most recent
case-but not the first case-to articulate the direct-and-control standard as an excep-
tion to the single-entity rule. See id at 2113.
78 See, for example, Michael A. Carrier, Limelight v. Akamai: Limiting Induced In-
fringement, 2014 Wis L Rev Online 1, 6 ("A reevaluation of the Federal Circuit's rule
nonetheless seemed to be an option suggested by the [Supreme] Court's continued re-
minders that it was assuming the validity of Muniauction.").
79 See Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2120. See also Supplemental Brief of Akamai Tech-
nologies, Inc and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Limelight Networks, Inc v
Akamai Technologies, Inc, Civil Action Nos 12-786 and 12-960, *6 (Fed Cir filed Dec 23,
2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 7231551).
80 See Jaasma, 26 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 429-30 (cited in note
62) (noting that the direct-and-control standard is used successfully in most cases in
which there is a contractual relationship between the joint infringers, but not when at
least one of the joint infringers is a user or customer).
81 See Reza Dokhanchy, Note, Cooperative Infringement: I Get By (Infringement
Laws) with a Little Help from My Friends, 26 Berkeley Tech L J 135, 136 (2011) ('Typi-
cally, the indirect liability theories of inducement and contributory infringement ... cov-
er infringement situations involving multiple parties.").
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direct infringement.2 Congress provided less guidance in the
Patent Act regarding how to determine liability for induced pa-
tent infringement than it did for direct patent infringement.
Thus, courts have supplemented the text of § 271(b) through
statutory interpretation. Historically, courts have interpreted
induced infringement under § 271(b) as requiring the presence
of direct infringement.83 Recently, the Supreme Court explicitly
affirmed that interpretation.84 Thus, just as direct infringement
requires that a single entity perform each and every element of
the patented invention, so too does induced infringement8 5
The following hypothetical situation illustrates this concept:
Matt Mastermind verbally convinces Gus Gullible to perform
half the steps of a patented method. Mastermind then talks Iris
Ignorant into performing the remaining steps. According to
§ 271(b), Mastermind is not liable for induced infringement.
However, if Mastermind convinces Gullible to perform each and
every step of the patented method alone-such that Gullible di-
rectly infringes the patent-Mastermind could be held liable for
induced patent infringement under § 271(b), at least if he knew
that the induced acts constituted direct infringement.
The Supreme Court applied this rule in a recent case. In
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA,86 Pentalpha, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Global-Tech, copied SEB's innovative "cool-
touch" deep fryer.87 Pentalpha then induced Sunbeam to sell the
allegedly infringing fryers to retail stores. 8 The Court held Pen-
talpha liable for induced infringement under § 271(b) because
Pentalpha knew that the induced acts constituted direct patent
infringement.89 Thus, unlike direct infringement, induced in-
fringement is not a strict-liability tort; the accused inducer must
82 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2065 (2011) (noting
that "at least some intent is required" by § 271(b) and, as such, "the inducement must
involve the taking of affirmative steps to bring about the desired result").
83 See, for example, Dynacore Holdings Corp v US Philips Corp, 363 F3d 1263,
1272 (Fed Cir 2004); Met-Coil Systems Corp v Korners Unlimited, Inc, 803 F2d 684, 687
(Fed Cir 1986) ("Absent direct infringement of the patent claims, there can be neither
contributory infringement... nor inducement of infringement.").
84 See Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2117 ("[O]ur case law leaves no doubt that inducement
liability may arise 'if, but only if, there is... direct infringement."') (brackets omitted).
85 See id.
86 131 S Ct 2060 (2011).
87 Id at 2064.
88 Id.
89 Id at 2071-72. Note that the jury found Pentalpha liable for both direct and in-
duced patent infringement, but the appeal concerned only the induced-infringement
issue. Id at 2064.
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have known that the acts that it induced constituted patent in-
fringement. 90 Moreover, an accused inducer may not hide its
head in the sand. Willful blindness constitutes knowledge.91
Accordingly, induced infringement under § 271(b) requires
(1) the presence of direct infringement and (2) the alleged induc-
er to knowingly induce acts that constitute direct infringement
of a valid patent.
C. Contributory Infringement
Like the doctrine of induced infringement, the contributory-
infringement doctrine addresses multiparty violations. Sec-
tion 271(c) states that a party is liable for contributory patent
infringement if it sells or offers to sell a material component of a
patented invention knowing that the component is "to be espe-
cially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement" of
the patent. Further, contributory infringement under § 271(c)
requires the presence of direct infringement.92 For an illustra-
tion of this rule, recall Mastermind from Part I.B. Assume that
instead of verbally convincing Gullible and Ignorant to jointly
perform all the patented method steps, he sold them a machine
specially designed to enable them to jointly perform the steps.
According to § 271(c), Mastermind is not liable for contributory
infringement because neither Gullible nor Ignorant performed
all the method steps alone. However, Mastermind could be liable
for contributory patent infringement under § 271(c) if he sold the
machine to Gullible only and knew that Gullible would have direct-
ly infringed the patent had he performed each and every step
himself.
Aro I and Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Re-
placement Co93 ("Aro II"), are formative contributory infringe-
ment cases. In Aro I, Convertible Top Replacement sued Aro
Manufacturing and certain car owners for direct infringement of
its patent covering a combination of components, one of which
90 See Global-Tech, 131 S Ct at 2068.
91 See id at 2070-71 ("[A] willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate ac-
tions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to
have actually known the critical facts.").
92 See Dynacore Holdings, 363 F3d at 1272 ("Indirect infringement, whether in-
ducement to infringe or contributory infringement, can only arise in the presence of di-
rect infringement."); Met-Coil Systems, 803 F2d at 687 ("Absent direct infringement of
the patent claims, there can be neither contributory infringement ... nor inducement of
infringement.").
93 377 US 476 (1964).
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was a "flexible top material" for certain convertible car tops. 94
This material eventually wore out on certain convertibles, and
the car owners (or repair shops) bought replacement fabric from
Aro Manufacturing.95 The Aro I Court held that, since the de-
fendants made, used, or sold only one element of the patented
invention-the flexible-top material-and no defendant made,
used, or sold every element of the patented invention, the de-
fendants were not liable for direct infringement.96 The Court also
held that Aro Manufacturing was not liable for contributory in-
fringement because contributory infringement cannot exist
without direct infringement.97
The Court reached a different conclusion in Aro II. It held
that the car owners at issue there-those that had purchased
Ford convertibles-had in fact directly infringed Convertible
Top's patent.98 This opposite holding can be chiefly attributed to
the differing facts in Aro II. Namely, the car owners in Aro I
owned General Motors cars, while the car owners in Aro H
owned Ford cars. Importantly, General Motors had a license to
practice the patent, while Ford did not.99 Thus, the Aro I defend-
ants were protected under the license, but the Aro II defendants
were not. Another significant point is that the Aro H Court held
Aro Manufacturing liable for contributory infringement because
Aro Manufacturing knew that its fabric top, which it designed
especially for the convertible cars, was infringing.100 Thus, like
induced infringement, contributory infringement is not a strict-
liability tort. It requires that the alleged contributory infringer
have prior knowledge of the patent as well as knowledge that its
actions would lead to patent infringement. 101
In summary, courts interpret § 271(c), which covers contrib-
utory infringement, to require: (1) direct infringement and
(2) that the alleged contributory infringer knew that its actions
would lead to infringement of a valid patent.
94 Aro1, 365 US at 339 & n 2.
95 Id at 337-38.
96 Id at 340.
97 Id at 341. See also Deepsouth Packing Co v Laitram Corp, 406 US 518, 526
(1972).
98 Aro II, 377 US at 485.
99 Id at 478-79.
100 Id at 488-89.
101 See id at 488.
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As this Part has discussed, the Patent Act recognizes three
causes of action for patent infringement-direct, induced, and
contributory patent infringement. In most cases, these claims
are adequate channels for protecting the rights associated with
valid patents. However, existing patent law leaves patent own-
ers vulnerable to a unique form of patent infringement: joint pa-
tent infringement.
II. THE JOINT PATENT INFRINGEMENT PROBLEM
Joint patent infringement occurs when multiple actors prac-
tice each and every element of a valid patent claim as a group,
but no single member practices all the claim elements alone.10o
Because existing patent law does not assign liability unless a
single entity performs all the claim elements, multiple actors can
shield themselves from infringement liability by working in con-
cert.103 This doctrinal loophole raises significant policy concerns.
This Part begins with an illustration of the joint-
infringement problem. It then presents several previously pro-
posed solutions and explains why these proposals are inadequate.
A. Joint Patent Infringement in Practice
Recall the hapless inventor introduced in the opening para-
graph of this Comment. As the owner of a valid patent, she be-
lieved that she could exclude others from practicing her patent
without her permission. However, a group of joint infringers
were able to get around her patent with impunity. This Section
sets forth the details of this inventor's unfortunate hypothetical
situation.
Several years ago, the inventor-after earning her graduate
degree at a top research institution-took a position as an inde-
pendent research scientist. She earned only a modest salary, but
she expected to make millions on her most recent idea-a
method of incorporating the specified dose of several different
medications into a single pill. Her invention would allow people
prescribed multiple medications to take only one pill. To deter-
mine whether her idea would work, the inventor invested her
entire savings in research and development. After several years,
102 See Lowrie, Littman, and Silva, 12 J High Tech L at 69 (cited in note 4).
103 See id at 76; Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2120.
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she successfully developed a process for making the unified pill.
She then retained a law firm to file a patent application on her
behalf. After a series of negotiations with a PTO patent examin-
er, the inventor received a patent on her method of making the
unified pill.1°4 Her patent claim read as follows: a method for
making a single pill comprising (1) crushing a pill consisting of
one medicine into a powder form, (2) crushing another pill con-
sisting of a different medicine into a powder form, (3) combining
the two different powders, and (4) filling an empty pill capsule
with the combined powder. Believing that her patent gave her
the right to exclude others from using her invention, she quit
her job and started her own business, using this method to make
and sell her patented product.
Business was great for several months, but it eventually
waned when a competitor entered the market. This competitor
performed the first three steps of the inventor's patent claim.
Then it sold the combined powder and a package of empty pill
capsules to its customers. These customers performed the final
step of the inventor's method themselves by filling each capsule
with the recommended amount of powder. Outraged, the inven-
tor sued her competitor for patent infringement. Yet, much to
her dismay, the district court dismissed her case for failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. Because neither
the competitor nor its customers performed all four steps by
themselves, they could not be held liable for patent infringe-
ment. Under existing law, when multiple entities jointly make,
use, or sell every element of a patented invention as a group-
but no single entity does so alone-they have not directly in-
fringed the patent under § 271(a).105 Nor have they indirectly in-
fringed the patent under § 271(b) or § 271(c) because both
induced infringement and contributory infringement require the
existence of direct infringement.106 Thus, through this joint con-
duct-termed "joint patent infringement"-the competitor was
able to profit from the inventor's valid patent without the
104 For a discussion of PTO patent negotiations, see Blaine Larson, Comment, How
Tangential Does It Have to Be? Making Sense of Festo's Tangential Limitations Doctrine,
48 Houston L Rev 959, 963-64 (2011) ('The [PTO] usually rejects the applicant's original
claims as overly broad in light of earlier patents or printed publications .... [Ilt often
takes patent applicants several rounds of narrowing amendments before the [PTO]
grants a patent.").
105 For a discussion of the single-entity rule, see Part I.A.
106 For a discussion of indirect infringement, see Parts I.B, I.C.
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inventor's permission and without penalty. This undesirable re-
sult invites an effective solution.
B. Proposed Solutions to the Joint Patent Infringement
Problem
Commentators have introduced various solutions to the
joint patent infringement problem. This Section discusses three
such proposed solutions. First, at least one commentator has
suggested that Congress should amend the Patent Act to include
a new cause of action: civil conspiracy to commit patent in-
fringement.107 Second, another school of thought posits that pa-
tent applicants should draft their patent claims in a unitary
fashion in order to preclude joint infringers from divvying up
various claim elements among themselves.108 Third, others have
argued that the direct-and-control exception to the single-entity
rule is too narrow and should be replaced with a less-limiting
participation-and-combined-action standard. 109  This Section
evaluates each of these proposals and explains how each fails to
solve the joint-infringement problem.
1. Civil conspiracy to commit patent infringement.
Conspiratorial patent infringement has been proposed to
mend the joint patent infringement loophole.110 Such a claim
would create liability for entities collaborating to infringe a pa-
tent.111 The current Patent Act, however, does not recognize this
claim as a viable cause of action. Consequently, at least one
commentator has urged Congress to create liability for it.112 But
thus far, Congress has declined to do so. Courts have also de-
clined to recognize conspiratorial patent infringement as a via-
ble cause of action. In Digene Corp v Ventana Medical Systems,
Inc113 and Conceal City, LLC v Looper Law Enforcement, LLC,114
107 See Long Truong, Note, After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspir-
atorial Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 Nw U L Rev
1897, 1927-28 (2009).
108 See Mark A. Lemley, et al, Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q J 255,
272-73 (2005).
109 See, for example, Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U Chi L J at 367-68, 391-92
(cited in note 73).
110 See Truong, Note, 103 Nw U L Rev at 1927 (cited in note 107).
111 See id at 1925.
112 See id at 1927-28.
113 476 F Supp 2d 444 (D Del 2007).
114 917 F Supp 2d 611 (ND Tex 2013).
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the respective plaintiffs asserted claims for civil conspiracy to
commit patent infringement.115 But the courts adjudicating these
cases determined that federal patent law conflict-preempts116
this state law claim because conspiracy to infringe does not in-
clude an additional element that is distinct from an inducement
claim under 35 USC § 271(b).117
The plaintiffs in Mopex, Inc v Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc 118
attempted, unsuccessfully, to circumvent this preemption issue
by arguing that the "agreement" element of a state conspiracy
claim is an additional element not required by § 271(b).119 The
Mopex court failed to see how "agreement" was meaningfully dif-
ferent from the knowingly aiding and abetting requirement for
an inducement claim.120 Thus, because a conspiratorial patent
infringement claim does not include elements distinct from in-
duced patent infringement under § 271(b), such a claim would
impermissibly "attempt to offer patent-like protection to subject
matter addressed by federal law.121 Because courts have con-
sistently declined to recognize a civil-conspiratorial-patent in-
fringement cause of action, it is not a workable solution for ad-
dressing the problem of joint patent infringement.
2. Unitary patent claim construction.
Constructing patent claims in a unitary fashion is another
proposed solution to the joint patent infringement problem.
Some commentators, including leading patent scholar Professor
Mark Lemley, have suggested that patent owners and patent
prosecutors might avoid the enforcement problems arising from
115 Digene, 476 F Supp 2d at 447; Conceal City, 917 F Supp 2d at 616.
116 Conflict preemption applies when state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. See Hunter
Douglas, Inc v Harmonic Design, Inc, 153 F3d 1318, 1332 (Fed Cir 1998).
117 See Digene, 476 F Supp 2d at 450-51 ("[The plaintiffs claim] alleging civil con-
spiracy, under Delaware law, to infringe Digene's asserted patents is preempted by con-
flict with the federal patent laws."); Conceal City, 917 F Supp 2d at 618 ("Conceal City's
Texas-law claim for civil conspiracy to infringe the [ ] patent is preempted by federal pa-
tent law and must be dismissed."). See also Mopex, Inc v Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc,
2003 WL 715652, *5 (ND Ill) ("[P]laintiffs conspiracy claim must be [conflict] preempted
because it is symmetrical with infringement and alleges nothing in addition to that re-
quired by the patent laws.").
118 2003 WL 715652 (ND Ill).
119 Id at *6.
120 Id ("If a party must knowingly aid and abet another party's direct infringement
for inducement under § 271(b), certainly it can be said that this party already 'agreed' to
the other party's acts constituting direct infringement.").
121 Digene, 476 F Supp 2d at 450-51.
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joint patent infringement by drafting unitary patent claims
when applying for patents. 122 A unitary patent claim is a series
of steps drafted such that only one entity could perform them.123
To illustrate Lemley's solution, consider the following unitary
patent claim: a method for code sharing comprising (1) a server
receiving a code request from a user and (2) the server sending
the user the requested code. The construction of this patent
claim restricts performance of steps (1) and (2) to the server
only; it leaves no room for the user to perform any of the steps.
To be sure, this solution works well in circumstances in which it
can be implemented-such as when the inventive method does
not require more than one entity to practice it.
However, in those situations in which practicing an in-
ventive method requires the participation of multiple entities,
unitary-claim drafting may be impractical or even impossible.124
In the network-computing context, for instance, "patented pro-
cesses may involve some steps performed on the client side and
others performed on the server side."125 Besides, "even if patent
claims are 'properly' drafted to focus on one particular entity, it
will almost always be possible to subdivide the performance of
the claimed steps between several entities when the actions of
multiple entities are contemplated and inherent to the pro-
cess."126 The following unitary patent claim illustrates this point:
a method of playing catch comprising (1) catching a ball thrown
by a pitcher and (2) returning the ball to the pitcher, with the
catcher performing the returning. While this claim requires that
the catcher perform both steps, the process of playing catch can-
not be completed unless the initial thrower catches the returned
ball. Thus, performance of this claim must be divided between
multiple parties. Further, even if patent applicants could draft
unitary patent claims to describe processes encompassing the
actions of multiple parties, doing so would likely result in "indi-
rect, passive, and confusing [patent] claims.127
Even so, when the Federal Circuit addressed the joint-
infringement issue in BMC, it endorsed this unitary-drafting
122 See, for example, Lemley, 33 AIPLA Q J at 272-73 (cited in note 108).
123 See id.
124 See Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U Chi L J at 404 (cited in note 73); Truong,
Note, 103 Nw U L Rev at 1920 (cited in note 107).
125 Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U Chi L J at 402 n 392 (cited in note 73).
126 Id at 406.
127 Id at 405.
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solution as the best available option. 128 Judge Linn also did so in
his Akamai dissent.129 Nonetheless, unitary claim drafting is not
a comprehensive solution to the joint-infringement problem for
at least three reasons. First, it is not always feasible to imple-
ment a unitary claim (for instance, it may be that the steps of a
patent process must be carried out by multiple parties). Second,
even if it is possible to implement a unitary patent claim, it is
difficult to do so. Lastly, unitary claim drafting could lead to de-
ficient patent claims that incorrectly describe the invention in
order to facilitate unitary construction.
3. The On Demand "participation-and-combination
standard."
The On Demand Machine Corp v Ingram Industries, Inc3o
participation-and-combination standard is a third possible solu-
tion to the joint-infringement problem.131 This solution suggests
replacing the direct-and-control standard-currently the sole ex-
ception to the single-entity requirement-with the less restric-
tive vicarious liability standard of participation and combina-
tion. In effect, this solution would narrow the single-entity rule
by broadening the exception to it. Weakening the single-entity
rule, however, might make innocent joint infringers-such as
everyday consumers ignorant of their infringing conduct-
vulnerable to liability for direct patent infringement, which is a
strict-liability offense.132 Moreover, as explained in detail be-
low, this solution could overwhelm an important aspect of the
Patent Act.
In the earliest joint-infringement cases, several federal
district courts ruled that joint infringement constituted direct
128 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1381 (stating that a party can offset joint-infringement
problems by strategic claim drafting, such as structuring a patent claim so that its steps
must be carried out by a single entity).
129 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1350 (Linn dissenting) (noting that the asserted claims
were drafted to require the activities of both Limelight and its customers; thus, Akamai
subjected itself to joint infringement).
130 442 F3d 1331 (Fed Cir 2006) ("On Demand").
131 See id at 1344-45 ("[T]he district court instructed ... [that] [w]here the in-
fringement is the result of the participation and combined action(s) of one or more per-
sons or entities, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for the infringement. We
discern no flaw in this instruction as a statement of law."). See also Greskowiak, Note,
41 Loyola U Chi L J at 391 (cited in note 73) ("The On Demand case unmistakably con-
firmed that joint infringement is a viable legal theory and results from the participation
and combined action of more than one entity.").
132 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1307.
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infringement under § 271(a) as long as there was "some connec-
tion" between the entities that jointly infringed the patented in-
vention.133 However, courts were inconsistent as to the degree of
closeness required to establish "some connection."'134 The Federal
Circuit remained silent on whether joint infringement constitut-
ed direct infringement under § 271(a) until 2006, when it was
asked to review a district court's jury instruction in On Demand.
At issue in that case was On Demand's method patent, which
claimed steps for enabling a customer to select a book that he
wanted copied and to make the copy. 35 On Demand alleged that
two defendants, Amazon.com and Lightning Source, had jointly
infringed its patent: Amazon.com enabled customers to select
books to copy, and Lightning Source produced the book copies
that customers ordered on Amazon.com.36 The district court
gave the following jury instruction:
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement
to be performed by one person or entity. When infringement
results from the participation and combined action(s) of
more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers
and jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a
patented process or method cannot be avoided by having
another perform one step of the process or method. Where the
infringement is the result of the participation and combined
133 Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U Chi L J at 364 (cited in note 73). See also, for ex-
ample, Marley Mouldings Ltd v Mikron Industries, Inc, 2003 WL 1989640, *3 (ND Ill)
("A party cannot avoid direct infringement merely by having another entity perform one
or more of the required steps when that party is connected with the entity performing
one or more of the required steps."); Cordis Corp v Medtronic AVE, Inc, 194 F Supp 2d
323, 350 (D Del 2002) (holding that a "close relationship" between the parties satisfied
the "some connection" test); Faroudja Laboratories, Inc v Dwin Electronics, Inc, 1999 WL
111788, *5 (ND Cal) (noting that "several district courts have found a party liable for
direct infringement of a process patent even where the various steps included in the pa-
tent are performed by distinct entities," so long as the finding is justified by "some con-
nection between the different entities"); E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co v Monsanto Co,
903 F Supp 680, 735 (D Del 1995) (stating that a first party paying a second party to
practice the initial steps of a patented method could not avoid direct-infringement liabil-
ity even if the first party practiced only the remaining steps of the patented method);
Metal Film Co v Metlon Corp, 316 F Supp 96, 111 (SDNY 1970) (holding the defendant
liable for direct infringement when it arranged for suppliers to complete the first step of
a patented method and then performed the remaining steps itself).
134 See Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U Chi L J at 366 (cited in note 73).
135 On Demand, 442 F3d at 1334.
136 Id at 1335-36.
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action(s) of one or more persons or entities, they are joint in-
fringers and are jointly liable for the infringement.11 7
On de novo review of the jury instruction, the Federal Circuit
stated that it could "discern no flaw in this instruction as a
statement of law."138
The plaintiff in BMC and some commentators have argued
that the Federal Circuit's statement regarding the jury instruc-
tion was a precedential adoption of the participation-and-
combination standard.139 However, the Federal Circuit has de-
nied this contention.140 Rather, the court has characterized its
statement in On Demand as dictum because the jury instruction
was not directly necessary to the court's decision in that case.' 4'
The Federal Circuit has endorsed the standard requiring control or
direction of an agent by a mastermind and rejected the partici-
pation-and-combination standard.142
One commentator has argued that overturning BMC and
applying the participation-and-combination standard is the best
solution to the joint-infringement problem.43 Certainly, the
joint-infringement loophole was not lost on the BMC court,
which acknowledged that "the standard requiring control or di-
rection for a finding of joint infringement may in some circum-
stances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to
avoid infringement."'' 4 However, the court concluded that the
joint-infringement concern "does not outweigh concerns over
137 Id at 1344-45 (emphasis added).
138 Id at 1345.
139 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1378 ("BMC argued that On Demand changed the law gov-
erning joint infringement by multiple parties."). See also, for example, Truong, Note, 103
Nw U L Rev at 1908 (cited in note 107) ("[T]he Federal Circuit's opinion in [On Demand]
contained language that seemed to create a [ ] theory of infringement that would have
greatly expanded liability for joint infringers by requiring only that there be 'participa-
tion' and a 'combination' of actions between parties."); Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U
Chi L J at 368 (cited in note 73) ("Even in its reversal, by considering the conduct of mul-
tiple discrete actors in determining whether joint infringement existed, the [On Demand]
panel's analysis further affirmed joint infringement as a viable legal theory.").
140 Judge Newman's dissent in Akamai is consistent with her position in the On
Demand majority opinion. In both cases, she opined that legal liability existed for joint
patent infringement. See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1322 (Newman dissenting) ("Direct in-
fringement may be by more than one entity."); On Demand, 442 F3d at 1344-45.
141 See BMC, 498 F3d at 1380 (noting that the district court properly analyzed Fed-
eral Circuit precedent by refusing to read the On Demand court's statement that there
was "no flaw" in the jury instruction as a "wholesale adoption" of the instruction).
142 See, for example, id at 1380-81.
143 See Greskowiak, Note, 41 Loyola U Chi L J at 410 (cited in note 73).
144 BMC, 498 F3d at 1381.
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expanding the rules governing direct infringement," which could
swallow the legal claim for indirect infringement.145 According to
the BMC court, the participation-and-combination standard
"would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement"
because a patent owner "would rarely, if ever, need to bring a
claim for indirect infringement."146 Instead, litigants would simp-
ly sue multiparty infringers for direct infringement under the
participation-and-combination standard. Noting that this stand-
ard would effectively nullify a concept that Congress codified in
the Patent Act, the BMC court refused to adopt the standard.147
In sum, the On Demand participation-and-combination solu-
tion would replace the direct-and-control exception to the single-
entity requirement with a less restrictive vicarious liability
standard. This solution, however, could result in courts penaliz-
ing innocent joint infringers ignorant of their infringing conduct
for direct patent infringement (a strict-liability offense).148 Thus,
although replacing the current direct-and-control exception with
the proposed participation-and-combination standard theoretical-
ly could resolve the joint infringement problem, the unwanted
consequences of doing so counsel against adopting that approach.
The existing proposals for addressing joint patent infringe-
ment are flawed. First, the conspiratorial patent infringement
solution is conflict-preempted by federal patent law and
moreover would require legislative action. Second, the solution
of unitary patent claim drafting, while theoretically viable, is
impractical in many instances. Finally, the participation-and-
combination solution has too much bite because it would poten-
tially subject the consuming public to direct patent infringement
claims. Courts are unlikely to accept that unwanted consequence.
Accordingly, a solution to the joint patent infringement problem
that is superior to the proposed solutions is needed. The next Part
focuses on such a solution-joint patent misappropriation.
145 Id. See also Akamai Technologies, 2015 WL 2216261 at *4-5 (asserting that an
expansive interpretation of § 271(a) renders § 271(b) and (c) superfluous and violates ac-
cepted principles of statutory construction).
146 BMC, 498 F3d at 1381.
147 Id (noting that expanding direct infringement would subvert the current statuto-
ry scheme for indirect infringement).
148 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1307.
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III. THE JOINT-PATENT-MISAPPROPRIATION SOLUTION
The three solutions discussed in Part II involve changing
current patent law or existing claim-drafting techniques. How-
ever, instead of focusing on patent-based approaches to resolving
the joint patent infringement problem, a superior solution is to
apply state-law misappropriation doctrine, in combination with
general tort principles.
Briefly, joint patent misappropriation is the wrongful acqui-
sition of another's patent and the subsequent profitable use of
that patent by multiple parties working in concert. 149 Joint-
patent-misappropriation claims are a superior solution because
they (1) are not preempted by federal patent law; (2) are prag-
matic-plaintiffs simply pursue the claims in state court; and
(3) include a requisite mens rea of at least knowledge, thereby
protecting unknowing consumers. Furthermore, the joint-
patent-misappropriation cause of action is an attractive solution
to the joint patent infringement problem because the misappro-
priation doctrine is generally not as restrictive as patent in-
fringement law. In particular, unlike patent infringement
claims, a successful misappropriation claim does not require
that a single entity perform each and every element of the pa-
tent claim. Joint patent misappropriation is simply an applica-
tion of the old and well-known misappropriation doctrine to joint
activity in the patent law context. Lastly, and most importantly,
such claims do not subvert patent law or congressional intent.
This Part begins by defining the common-law doctrine of
misappropriation and setting forth the elements of a misappro-
priation claim. It then explains this doctrine's application to the
patent context. In so doing, it lays the foundation for under-
standing the concept of joint patent misappropriation. Once that
foundation is laid, this Part defines joint patent misappropria-
tion and explains the intricacies of such a claim. Finally, it con-
siders how this claim might be applied to the facts of two recent
joint patent infringement cases.
149 See Heather Richtarcsik, Note, Misappropriation in Massachusetts and around
the Country: How Technology Will Utilize This Tort, 35 New Eng L Rev 717, 729 (2001).
See also Black's Law Dictionary 1088 (West 9th ed 2009) (defining "misappropriation" as
"[tihe application of another's property or money dishonestly to one's own use").
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A. The Doctrine of Misappropriation and Its Application to
Patents
In order to establish that the joint-patent-misappropriation
cause of action is better than existing proposals, it is important
to understand misappropriation doctrine more generally. Mis-
appropriation is a common-law form of unfair competition.150 The
Supreme Court described the tort of misappropriation as "an
unauthorized interference with the normal operation of [a] com-
plainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the
profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the
profit from those who have earned it to those who have not.151
While misappropriation law varies by state, a successful misap-
propriation claim generally requires proof that (1) the plaintiff
"made a substantial investment of time, effort, and money in[]
creating the thing misappropriated such that the court can
characterize that 'thing' as a kind of property right"; (2) the de-
fendant "appropriated the 'thing' at little or no cost, such that
the court can characterize [the] defendant's actions as 'reaping
where it has not sown"'; and (3) the defendant's acts injured the
plaintiff.152 In the context of patent misappropriation, the thing
appropriated would be a patented invention.
Patent-misappropriation claims are not appropriate in every
instance. Indeed, in cases in which 35 USC § 271 works properly
to protect patent owners' rights, it is unnecessary to pursue a
patent-misappropriation claim at all-an injured plaintiff could
simply seek recourse through patent law. In fact, not only would
it be unnecessary to bring a misappropriation claim in such a
case, but federal preemption law would also preclude the claim
under the doctrine of conflict preemption.53 Moreover, if a pa-
tent owner wanted to sue a single actor for patent misappropria-
tion, she would find no remedy because federal patent law would
150 See Elaine Stoll, Comment, Hot News Misappropriation: More Than Nine Dec-
ades after INS v. AP, Still an Important Remedy for News Piracy, 79 U Cin L Rev 1239,
1241 (2011) ("The tort of misappropriation is a species of unfair competition."). See also
United States Sporting Products, Inc v Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc, 865 SW2d 214,
217 (Tex App 1993) (characterizing unfair competition as an "umbrella for all statutory
and nonstatutory causes of action," such as misappropriation, "arising out of business
conduct which is contrary to honest practice in industrial or commercial matters").
151 International News Service v The Associated Press, 248 US 215, 240 (1918).
152 David W. Barnes, Misappropriation of Trademark, 9 NC J L & Tech 171, 174
(2008).
153 For a discussion of federal preemption law, see Part III.D.3.
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preempt such a suit.154 However, joint patent infringement cre-
ates a distinct problem that requires a unique solution. In joint
patent infringement cases, in which patent holders' rights cur-
rently fall through a crack in the patent law,155 a joint-patent-
misappropriation claim-specifically, conspiratorial, aiding-and-
abetting, or induced patent misappropriation-would provide an
adequate safeguard.
B. Joint Patent Misappropriation
Joint patent misappropriation occurs when multiple actors
misappropriate a plaintiffs patent in concert, and no single ac-
tor does so alone. Because misappropriation is a common-law
tort, the plaintiff must rely on third-party liability under tradi-
tional tort doctrines to recover from defendants in those cases. 156
The most relevant tort doctrines are: (1) liability for conspiring
to commit a tort, 157 (2) liability for aiding and abetting commis-
sion of a tort,158 and (3) liability for inducing a tort.159 The ensu-
ing discussion identifies three joint-patent-misappropriation
claims based on these tort doctrines-conspiratorial, aiding-and-
abetting, and induced patent misappropriation-and analyzes
each in turn.
1. Conspiratorial patent misappropriation.
Conspiracy law varies by state. 160 In most states, establish-
ing a civil conspiracy requires a plaintiff to prove: "(1) an associ-
ation of two or more persons; (2) an unlawful objective; (3) an
agreement, understanding, or 'meeting of the minds' regarding
154 See, for example, Mopex, 2003 WL 715652 at *5 (noting that federal patent law
would preempt state claims that simply duplicate federal infringement claims and pro-
vide extra damages or double recoveries). See also Part III.D.3.
155 Judge Moore characterizes this crack as a "gaping hole." Akamai Technologies,
Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 2015 WL 2216261, *12 (Fed Cir) (Moore dissenting).
156 See Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We
Bury It or Revive It?, 70 ND L Rev 781, 781 (1994) (explaining that the Supreme Court
recognized the misappropriation cause of action under federal common law). Note that
the law of indirect infringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks also derives from
common-law tort doctrines. See Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort
Law Perspective, 42 U Richmond L Rev 635, 636 (2008).
157 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) (1979).
158 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979).
159 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(a) (1979).
160 See Stoll, Comment, 79 U Cin L Rev at 1247-48 (cited in note 150) (explaining
that some states have embraced the common-law misappropriation doctrine, while oth-
ers have yet to acknowledge it).
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the objective and the means of pursuing it; (4) commission of an
unlawful act in furtherance of the agreement; and (5) injury re-
sulting from the conspiracy.161 While a minority of jurisdictions
have acknowledged civil conspiracy as an independent tort, the
majority of states require civil conspiracy claims to incorporate
an underlying tort.162 In other words, in most cases, a plaintiff
cannot bring a civil conspiracy suit unless she has been injured
by an act that was itself tortious.163 In addition, the requisite
scienter in many state civil conspiracy laws is intent.164
For conspiratorial patent misappropriation, the underlying
tortious act is patent misappropriation. Thus, if a plaintiff is
able to establish all the elements of the patent-misappropriation
claim, as provided in Part III.A, and all the elements of the civil
conspiracy claim, as provided in this Section, the defendant
would typically be liable for conspiratorial patent misappropria-
tion. However, in states in which the scienter standard requires
intent, a conspiratorial-patent-misappropriation claim might be
unsuitable. For example, if a defendant provides a user with a
product that has many uses, the defendant could simply argue
that he did not intend for the user to perform the remaining
steps of the plaintiffs patent. Therefore, provided that the fact
finder believes the defendant, the conspiratorial-patent-
misappropriation claim would likely fail. Further, the defendant
could argue that there was no meeting of the minds, another ele-
ment of a conspiratorial-patent-misappropriation claim.1 5 This
argument could be effective if the joint actors never mutually
agreed to misappropriate the patent at issue. Here again, a con-
spiratorial-patent-misappropriation claim might fail.
Hence, a conspiratorial-patent-misappropriation claim does
not resolve the joint patent infringement problem in every in-
stance. However, an injured plaintiff may instead turn to other
third-party claims for relief. For example, in cases in which it is
difficult to prove specific intent or mutual assent, a plaintiff
161 Truong, Note, 103 Nw U L Rev at 1923 (cited in note 107).
162 See id. See also Steven A. Beckelman and Judah Skoff, Legal Defenses to Con-
spiracy or Aiding and Abetting Claims, 243 NY L J 1, 4 (June 21, 2010).
163 See Truong, Note, 103 Nw U L Rev at 1923 (cited in note 107).
164 See, for example, Conceal City, LLC v Looper Law Enforcement, LLC, 917 F Supp
2d 611, 617 (ND Tex 2013); Reading Radio, Inc v Fink, 833 A2d 199, 212 (Pa App 2003)
(holding that an unjustified intent to injure is an essential part of a civil conspiracy
claim).
165 See Conceal City, 917 F Supp 2d at 617.
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might pursue an aiding-and-abetting-patent-misappropriation
claim.
2. Aiding-and-abetting patent misappropriation.
Generally, aiding and abetting occurs when one party advis-
es or encourages another party to perform an underlying tort.166
A claim for civil aiding and abetting is similar to one for civil
conspiracy. There are, however, some subtle differences.
Although the line is not always clear,167 a crucial distinction is
that aiding and abetting requires an agreement, while conspira-
cy does not.168 Another important distinction is that civil aiding
and abetting requires "substantial assistance," but civil conspir-
acy does not.169 Thus, a defendant may be liable for civil conspir-
acy even if he did not substantially assist his co-conspirators,
while aiding and abetting requires deeper involvement.170
The requisite scienter for aiding and abetting varies by
state, but the general elements of aiding-and-abetting liability
are consistent: (1) the existence of an underlying tort, (2) the de-
fendant's knowledge of the underlying tort, and (3) the defend-
ant's substantial assistance in the commission of the underlying
tort.'7 ' Here, the underlying tort in aiding-and-abetting-patent-
misappropriation claims is patent misappropriation. Notably, in
the patent context, this form of liability protects customers who
unknowingly perform steps of a method patent. These customers
would not have the necessary scienter-knowledge of the under-
lying patent-misappropriation tort-to incur liability.
In cases in which a defendant takes a less hands-on approach
and does not substantially assist others in misappropriating a pa-
tent, he cannot be held liable for aiding-and-abetting patent mis-
appropriation.172 In those cases, an injured plaintiff might instead
bring a claim for induced patent misappropriation.
166 See Adams, 42 U Richmond L Rev at 640 (cited in note 156).
167 See Nathan Issac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 Vand L
Rev 241, 257 (2005) ("Courts and commentators frequently blur the distinction between
conspiracy and aiding and abetting.").
168 See id.
169 See id at 257-58 ("[F]or conspiracy liability, a defendant need only provide the
assistance inherent within the agreement itself.").
170 See id at 258-59.
171 See Mark Bartholomew and Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 Vand




3. Induced patent misappropriation.
Civil inducement covers situations in which one party or-
ders or induces another party's tortious conduct.113 Such claims
are different from aiding-and-abetting claims in that they do not
require substantial assistance; however, the two types of claims
often overlap.174 For instance, a party that orders or induces tor-
tious conduct might also substantially assist with carrying out
the tortious acts.175
The general elements of inducement are provided in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 877(a): (1) the existence of an un-
derlying tort, (2) the defendant's actual or constructive
knowledge of the underlying tort, (3) the defendant's inducement
of the performance of the underlying tort, and (4) the defend-
ant's specific intent to bring about the underlying tort. Again,
the underlying tort in induced-patent-misappropriation claims is
patent misappropriation.
Importantly, for joint-patent-misappropriation claims, the
inducement cannot rise to the level of direction or control. In
cases in which the inducer directs or controls the conduct of his
coactors, he may be liable as a principal or mastermind under
the law of agency in addition to being liable for inducement.176
However, since such conduct is an exception to the single-entity
rule, an injured plaintiff would be able to bring a claim for direct
patent infringement under these circumstances.177 In fact, feder-
al patent law would conflict-preempt an induced-patent-
misappropriation claim if the BMC direct-and-control standard
were met. 178 This is because a conflict would exist between fed-
eral patent law and state misappropriation law if both could be
used to adjudicate a dispute.179 Under federal preemption law for
patents, federal law would trump state law.
In practice, this sort of conflict might occur if there were a
question whether the inducement met the BMC direct-and-
control standard and the plaintiff brought both claims-the di-
rect patent infringement claim and the induced-patent-
misappropriation claim-in court. Because these two claims are
173 See Adams, 42 U Richmond L Rev at 642 (cited in note 156).
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id at 643.
177 For a discussion of the direct-and-control standard, see Part I.A.2.
178 See Part III.D.3.
179 For a discussion of federal preemption law, see Part III.D.3.
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mutually exclusive, at least one of them would fail once the
court determined the level of inducement that had occurred.
Part III.B described the three types of liability for joint-
patent-misappropriation claims and how such claims would
function in theory. Each species of claim discussed above is theo-
retically available to plaintiffs, depending on the circumstances
of the case. Although there is some overlap between the ele-
ments of the three claims, they vary enough to encompass a
broad range of joint misconduct. Thus, the enhanced remedial
flexibility that these claims offer would be advantageous to plain-
tiffs. The next Section aims to provide concrete examples of how
joint-patent-misappropriation claims would work in practice.
C. Applying the Joint-Patent-Misappropriation Solution
To illustrate how the proposed solution would operate in
practice, consider how joint patent misappropriation would be
applied to the facts of two important district court companion
cases-Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Incl8o
and McKesson Information Solutions LLC v Epic Systems
Corp.181 The Federal Circuit consolidated these cases when it de-
cided the joint patent infringement issue en banc in Akamai.182
The facts of the consolidated case, as presented by the Fed-
eral Circuit on appeal, are as follows: Akamai Technologies owns
a patent that covers a method for delivering Web content.183 The
patented method steps include (1) placing a content provider's
content on a server and (2) modifying the content provider's Web
site.84 The defendant, Limelight Networks, performed some
steps of the patented method but induced other parties to com-
mit the remaining steps. 8 5 Specifically, Limelight placed the con-
tent providers' content on a server and then instructed its cus-
tomers to modify the content providers' Web sites themselves.186
The defendant in McKesson jointly infringed a patent in a
different way. It induced multiple other parties to collectively
180 614 F Supp 2d 90 (D Mass 2009).
181 2009 WL 2915778 (ND Ga) ("McKesson").
182 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1301.
183 Id at 1306.
184 Id.
1s5 Id at 1305.
186 Akamai, 692 F3d at 1306.
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perform all the steps of the claimed method, but no single party
performed every step itself.187 The plaintiff in McKesson owns a
patent covering a method of electronic communication between
health care providers and their patients.188 The defendant, Epic
Systems, owns a software program that permits health care pro-
viders to communicate electronically with their patients. 189
Although Epic did not perform any of the steps of McKesson's
method patent, its software enabled the health care providers
and their patients to jointly perform each and every step of the
patented method themselves.190 Arguably, by dividing the pa-
tented steps among multiple parties, Limelight and Epic each
attempted to shield themselves from patent infringement liabil-
ity, leaving the patent owners with no remedy under federal pa-
tent law,191 even though the joint conduct resulted in an outcome
that, if performed by a single actor, would have been held to vio-
late the patent owners' rights.
On appeal in Akamai, the Federal Circuit did not explicitly
determine Limelight's scienter, nor that of its customers. Be-
cause Limelight performed all but one of the patented method
steps and instructed its customers to perform the final step
themselves, it seems fair to assume that Limelight "should
[have] know[n] of circumstances that would make the conduct
tortious if it were [its] own."192 Indeed, based on these facts, a
fact finder could infer that Limelight possessed specific intent to
misappropriate Akamai's patent-Limelight did, after all, in-
struct its customers to perform the final patented step.193
If Limelight's customers' acts could be considered Lime-
light's acts under the Restatement, Limelight would be liable for
direct infringement.194 But general tort liability and induced pa-
tent infringement liability are not equivalent; BMC holds that
"(1) liability for induced infringement requires proof of direct in-
fringement and (2) liability for direct infringement requires that
a single party commit all the acts necessary to constitute in-




190 Akamai, 692 F3d at 1306.
191 See id.
192 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(a) (1979).
193 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1306.
194 For a discussion of direct infringement, see Part I.A.
195 Akamai, 692 F3d at 1308.
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patent infringement under § 271(b). Misappropriation, however,
has no such restriction. If Limelight's customers' acts were
Limelight's acts, Limelight would be liable for directly misap-
propriating Akamai's patent. Thus, under misappropriation doc-
trine and induced tort liability, Limelight could be liable for in-
duced patent misappropriation.
The facts in McKesson suggest that the defendant could be
liable for aiding-and-abetting misappropriation, depending on
its level of knowledge. A showing of specific intent to cause pa-
tent misappropriation is not required for aiding-and-abetting
misappropriation.196 If Epic knew about McKesson's patent, and
there were no uses for Epic's product other than the misappro-
priating use, then a court might find Epic liable for aiding-and-
abetting patent misappropriation. 197 However, if Epic's product
had other uses such that Epic could not anticipate that its cus-
tomers would use the product to misappropriate McKesson's pa-
tent, a fact finder might determine that Epic did not have the
necessary mens rea to commit joint patent misappropriation. In
such a case, Epic might not face liability for aiding-and-abetting
patent misappropriation.
Notably, neither of these cases could be resolved by bringing
contributory patent infringement claims under § 271(c). Specifi-
cally, contributory patent infringement requires direct patent in-
fringement, and direct infringement is limited by the single-
entity rule-a single party must perform each and every ele-
ment of a patent to be held liable for direct infringement.198 An
aiding-and-abetting-patent-misappropriation claim differs from
a contributory patent infringement claim in that the former is
not limited by the single-entity rule. Thus, under the misappro-
priation doctrine and general tort liability, Epic could be liable
for aiding-and-abetting patent misappropriation, but not for con-
tributory patent infringement.
To summarize, the combination of the misappropriation doc-
trine and general theories of tort liability provides a unique so-
lution to the joint patent infringement problem, as evidenced by
its application to the facts of Akamai and McKesson. Unlike the
solution that the Federal Circuit applied in the recently reversed
196 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979).
197 See Adams, 42 U Richmond L Rev at 656 (cited in note 156) ("[S]elling a compo-
nent with no substantial use other than for infringement would almost always constitute
'substantial assistance' to an infringer.").
198 For a discussion of contributory infringement, see Part I.A.
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consolidated appeal, 199 this joint-patent- misappropriation solu-
tion respects the existing boundaries of patent law while allow-
ing entities injured by joint patent infringement to seek relief.
The solution, however, is not unassailable. The next Section an-
ticipates some objections to this solution and responds to each.
D. Possible Objections to the Joint-Patent-Misappropriation
Solution
There are at least three foreseeable arguments against
bringing joint-patent-misappropriation claims to seek tradition-
al, tort-based relief against joint patent infringers: (1) tradition-
al tort liability does not provide a remedy for joint tortious activ-
ity, (2) state forum shopping will occur because some states do
not recognize the misappropriation doctrine, and (3) federal pa-
tent law preempts all state-law-patent-misappropriation claims.
Analysis of each objection, however, demonstrates that none is
persuasive enough to reject the solution that this Comment
proposes.
1. Inapplicability of tort liability to joint misappropriation.
Some have argued that traditional tort liability cannot ap-
ply to multiple entities that misappropriate a patent as a
group. 200 Specifically, these advocates reason that, since none of
the actors alone committed any tortious conduct, the actors can-
not be properly characterized as tortfeasors.21 This argument, in
effect, incorporates a single-entity rule into traditional tort law.
It is thus unsound.
Several legal commentators and courts have suggested that
a tortfeasor need not be a single actor. First, Professor William
Prosser has argued that "[n]obody knows what exactly is a joint
199 The Akamai court, in a 6-5 decision, attempted to resolve the issue of joint pa-
tent infringement by expanding § 271(b), which governs indirect infringers (that is, those
inducing patent infringement). It held Limelight and Epic liable for induced infringe-
ment under § 271(b) even though neither party directly infringed a patent. See generally
Akamai, 692 F3d 1301, revd Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2119-20.
200 See, for example, Brief of Defendant-Cross-Appellant Limelight Networks, Inc on
Rehearing En Banc, Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, Civil Action
Nos 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417, *50 (Fed Cir filed Aug 3, 2011) (avail-
able on Westlaw at 2011 WL 3796785) ("[T]he mens rea requirement for co-conspirator
liability is incompatible with the strict-liability nature of direct infringement.").
201 See, for example, id (arguing that the prerequisites for conspiratorial liability-
namely, commission of a tort by a primary tortfeasor and knowledge of the wrongful na-
ture of this conduct-were not met).
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tort" and that "joint tort-feasor" means radically different things
to different courts, and often even to the same court.2 02 Second,
Black's Law Dictionary defines "joint tortfeasors" as "[t]wo or
more tortfeasors who contributed to the claimant's injury and
who may be joined as defendants in the same lawsuit."203 Third,
as the Federal Circuit noted several times in Akamai,204 Judge
Giles Rich, one of the drafters of the Patent Act, has noted that,
"where two people [ ] together create an infringement which nei-
ther one of them individually or independently commits ....
they are joint tortfeasors.205 This might suggest that the Feder-
al Circuit would consider two people whose combined actions
misappropriate a patent to be joint tortfeasors.
It is true that, even if the aggregate conduct of joint actors
constitutes a tort, the individual conduct of one joint tortfeasor
might not itself satisfy all the elements of a tort claim. Consider
the following situation: Several defendants independently pol-
lute a stream on the plaintiffs property, but, standing alone,
each defendant has committed no tort-none of the defendants
has been negligent, nor has any of them individually caused any
legally cognizable harm.206 But the combined acts of all the de-
fendants have rendered the stream entirely unfit for use. Obvi-
ously, the plaintiffs interests have been invaded.207 If each de-
fendant escapes liability on the ground that his individual
contribution was de minimis, the plaintiff has no remedy.208
Nonetheless, a single actor has committed a tort if he has the
scienter that the particular tort requires and his coactors have
completed the remaining elements of the relevant tort.209 Prosser
202 William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal L Rev 413, 413
(1937).
203 Black's Law Dictionary at 1627 (cited in note 149).
204 See Akamai, 692 F3d at 1310.
205 Id at 1311.
206 For the basis of this example, see Hill v Smith, 32 Cal 166, 167 (1867) (noting
that the injury from the conduct of one actor might be so small as to avoid materially
affecting the water, meaning that the conduct cannot be negligent).
207 See id at 167-68. See also Prosser, 25 Cal L Rev at 439-40 (cited in note 202).
208 See Hill, 32 Cal at 167-68. See also Prosser, 25 Cal L Rev at 439-40 (cited in
note 202).
209 See, for example, Boeing Co v Washington, 572 P2d 8, 12 (Wash 1978) ("[Ilf two
individuals commit independent acts of negligence which concur to produce the proxi-
mate cause of an injury to a third person, they are to be regarded as concurrent tort-
feasors, and each is liable as if solely responsible for the injury."). See also Christopher
T. Moore, Note, Torts: Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp.-Are You Satisfied? Oklahoma's




has explained this concept, noting that if "the individual defend-
ant knows, or at least has reason to know, that his conduct may
concur with that of others to cause injury," then the plaintiff
should be entitled to relief.210
Consider this concept in the patent context: An individual
sells a product-knowing or intending that his customers will
use the product in a wrongful, tortious way. Depending on the
requisite scienter, he has potentially committed a wrong. Nota-
bly, this wrong could not be patent infringement in the absence
of direct infringement, as each form of patent infringement re-
quires direct infringement-a strict-liability offense.11 Converse-
ly, patent misappropriation is not a strict-liability offense. In
fact, International News Service v The Associated Press22 seems
to suggest that the Court intended for misappropriation claims
to require scienter.213 Indeed, the INS Court contemplated the
defendant's intentions throughout the opinion. For example, the
Court stated that the "defendant in appropriating [material that
had been acquired by the complainant] and selling it as its own
is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown," that the appro-
priation "amounts to an unauthorized interference with the
normal operation of complainant's legitimate business ... in or-
der to divert ... profit from those who have earned it to those
who have not," and that the defendant is "misappropriating []
for the purpose of disposing of [the thing misappropriated] to his
own profit and to the disadvantage of complainant."214 Therefore,
because patent misappropriation is not a strict-liability tort,215
Akamai does not counsel against holding multiple independent
parties liable for jointly misappropriating a patent-even if none
of them does so alone. According to Akamai, the reason that
Generally speaking, all individuals sharing responsibility for the commission of
a tort are jointly liable for that tort. At times, the actions of two or more de-
fendants may concur to produce a single, indivisible harm. In such an instance,
the parties producing the harm have been considered joint tortfeasors. Where
no concert of action exists, but instead the independent actions of two or more
parties cause the harm, the parties are known as concurrent tortfeasors.
210 Prosser, 25 Cal L Rev at 441 (cited in note 202).
211 See note 83. See also Parts I.B, I.C.
212 248 US 215 (1918) ("INS").
213 See id at 239-40.
214 Id (emphasis added).
215 See Linda B. Samuels and Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act:
The States' Response, 24 Creighton L Rev 49, 57 (1990) ("Liability for misappropriation
can extend to those who knew or should have known of the misappropriation, including
third parties.").
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"[djirect infringement has not been extended to cases in which
multiple independent parties perform the steps of the method
claim" is "[b]ecause direct infringement is a strict liability
tort.216 However, under the misappropriation doctrine, there can
be no tortious conduct unless the individual defendant knows, or
at least has reason to know, that his conduct may concur with
that of others to cause injury.217 Thus, a party that knowingly
combines its actions with those of another to commit a misap-
propriation tort-even if each party's acts, standing alone, would
not be wrongful-could be held liable if the acts together harmed
the plaintiff.218
2. Forum shopping.
An additional concern that could be raised in response to a
state-law solution to joint patent infringement is that this ap-
proach will encourage forum shopping-the practice adopted by
some litigants to ensure that their case is heard in the court be-
lieved most likely to render a favorable judgment.219 While choice-
of-law rules in tort cases usually require courts to apply the law of
the state in which the tort victim was injured, some states have
different choice-of-law rules that apply specifically to misappro-
priation.220 In addition, state misappropriation claims differ from
state to state-some states refuse to recognize the misappropria-
tion tort at all.221 Thus, the forum-shopping concern is foreseeable.
This concern, however, rests on a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Critically, more states will begin to acknowledge the joint-
patent-misappropriation claim if it proves viable. The Uniform
216 Akamai, 692 F3d at 1307.
217 See Prosser, 25 Cal L Rev at 441 (cited in note 202).
218 See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 52 at 355
(West 5th ed 1984).
219 See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q J 401, 402-03
(2010) (explaining that forum shopping occurs when a litigant selects a forum based on
specific jurisdictional characteristics such as win rate, likelihood of reaching trial, and
speed of resolution).
220 See, for example, Salton, Inc v Philips Domestic Appliances and Personal Care
BV, 391 F3d 871, 878-79 (7th Cir 2004) ("[T]he Illinois choice of law rule applicable to
misappropriation ... [applies the law of] the place where the misappropriation took
place or the defendant obtained the benefit of the misappropriation, the latter being the
state or other jurisdiction in which the defendant has its principle place of business.").
221 See Stoll, Comment, 79 U Cin L Rev at 1247 n 52 (cited in note 150) (noting that
state courts in Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin have
adopted the misappropriation doctrine, though Massachusetts and Hawaii have specifi-
cally rejected it as preempted).
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Trade Secrets Act222 (UTSA) is a good example of this phenome-
non.223 After the Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron
Corp224 that federal patent law did not conflict-preempt state-
court-trade-secret-misappropriation claims,225 Congress enacted
the UTSA of 1979 to address the disparate treatment of state
trade secret law among the state courts. 226 At the time, individu-
al state legislatures that chose to adopt the statute had to enact
the law themselves.227 Five states quickly adopted the UTSA, but
most states were slow to do so, continuing to apply the Restate-
ment instead.228 Eventually, the statute became prevalent, such
that forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have now
adopted some version of the UTSA.229 The joint-patent-
misappropriation doctrine could spread in a similar manner.
In addition, the economy might spur wider acceptance of
joint-patent-misappropriation claims. It is conceivable that
businesses would consider whether a state recognizes the mis-
appropriation tort when deciding where to incorporate or estab-
lish their principal places of business.230 Thus, abstaining state
legislatures might view recognition of this tort as a business-
friendly initiative. If realized, this dynamic has the potential to
resolve the forum-shopping issue.
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the mis-
appropriation cause of action fails to become widespread in the
future, this solution would still be available (1) when the
misappropriation occurs in a state that recognizes the misap-
propriation claim or (2) when a litigant has a place of business
222 14 ULA 529 (1985).
223 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 Hamline L
Rev 493, 538 (2010) (noting that, in less than ten years, over half the states adopted
the UTSA).
224 416 US 470 (1974) ("Kewanee").
225 See Sandeen, 33 Hamline L Rev at 516 (cited in note 223).
226 See id at 496 (asserting that the states-which, prior to the UTSA, had the free-
dom to accept or reject various arguments for recognition, expansion, or narrowing of
trade secret law-were confined by the adoption of the UTSA).
227 See id at 538.
228 See id.
229 Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina have not enacted the UTSA, but
they offer statutory or common-law protection that corresponds to many of the UTSA's
key principles. See Brian T. Yeh, Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law
and Legislation *6 & n 36 (Congressional Research Service, Sept 5, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/4K3Q-FKAZ.
230 See Salton, 391 F3d at 878-79 (noting that a company's principal place of busi-
ness typically determines which law applies in trade secret misappropriation cases).
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or is incorporated in a state that recognizes the misappropria-
tion claim. Also, since at least fourteen states have already
acknowledged the common-law misappropriation claim,231 this
state-law solution could considerably reduce the negative effects
of the joint-infringement problem.
Furthermore, despite limits on the state forums in which a
litigant could bring a patent-misappropriation claim, pursuing a
joint-patent-misappropriation claim would likely have little or
no effect on a plaintiffs choice of forum. State-law misappropria-
tion suits will almost certainly end up in federal court. The fol-
lowing example illustrates what would most likely happen: A
plaintiff brings a joint-patent-misappropriation claim in the
state court in which her chances of winning are greatest.
Though patents are presumed valid,232 the defendant will surely
want to rebut that presumption. Besides state court, there are
two other forums in which the defendant can challenge the pa-
tent's validity-in federal district court or at the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB).233 Thus, the defendant can do one of
two things if he does not want to stay in state court: (1) remove
the case to federal court or (2) ask the state court for a stay
while the PTAB considers the validity of the patent at issue.234 If
the defendant takes the first route, he will remove the case to
federal court under 28 USC § 1454.235 Once the case is removed,
the federal court will apply the relevant state law to resolve the
joint-patent-misappropriation claim. Alternatively, if the de-
fendant takes the second route-and the state court grants the
stay-the PTAB will determine the patent's validity.236 If the
231 See Stoll, Comment, 79 U Cin L Rev at 1247-48 & n 52 (cited in note 150).
232 35 USC § 282(a).
233 The PTAB is an administrative body of the PTO that decides issues of patentabil-
ity. See 35 USC § 6(a)-(b).
234 State courts are adequate forums in which to adjudicate patent validity issues.
See Jacobs Wind Electric Co v Florida Department of Transportation, 919 F2d 726, 728
(Fed Cir 1990) ("[A]lithough a state court is without power to invalidate an issued patent,
there is no limitation on the ability of a state court to decide the question of validity
when properly raised in a state court proceeding.").
235 See 28 USC § 1454 (allowing a defendant with a patent-invalidity counterclaim
to timely remove the case to federal court).
236 It is unclear whether the state court would grant such a stay; state courts have
not yet had the opportunity to address this issue because Congress only recently created
the PTAB on September 16, 2012. Federal district courts have now begun to mandate such
stays when requested. In a recent split decision, the Federal Circuit ordered the Eastern
District of Texas to stay district court litigation pending a covered-business-method PTAB
review, reversing the district court's decision to deny the accused infringer's motion
to stay. The decision was the Federal Circuit's first opportunity to weigh in on newly
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PTAB invalidates the patent, the patent owner cannot pursue
any claim related to that patent because the patent would no
longer exist.237 However, if the PTAB finds the patent valid, the
patent owner may then bring her misappropriation claim in
state court-at which point the defendant can remove the case
to federal court under 28 USC § 1454. Thus, irrespective of the
state forum in which the plaintiff chooses to bring her joint-
patent-misappropriation claim, the federal court would deter-
mine which state law to apply based on choice-of-law rules. In
short, when bringing any misappropriation claim, state court fo-
rum shopping would be futile; the state court in which the com-
plaint is filed is immaterial to choice-of-law rules in misappro-
priation cases.238
3. Federal preemption.
Federal preemption is the primary objection to pursuing
state-law-joint-patent-misappropriation claims to resolve the
joint patent infringement problem. Because federal law controls
patent infringement causes of action, there might be some reti-
cence about a state-law solution to joint patent infringement.
While most of the case law relating to the misappropriation doc-
trine is federal, following Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins239-the
Supreme Court decision purportedly abolishing federal common
law-courts have had to deal with misappropriation as a state-
law doctrine. 240 Since Erie, at least fourteen states have recog-
nized the misappropriation tort.241 Once litigants began to bring
misappropriation claims in state court, however, preemption be-
came a common objection.242
Under Supreme Court precedent, state law may be
preempted in three ways: (1) explicit preemption, (2) field
enacted statutory provisions that provide for immediate interlocutory appeal from a dis-
trict court's grant or denial of a motion to stay litigation pending a covered-business-
method PTAB review. See VirtualAgility Inc v Salesforce.com, Inc, 759 F3d 1307, 1320
(Fed Cir 2014).
237 See SCVNGR, Inc v eCharge Licensing, LLC, 2014 WL 4804738, *8 (D Mass) ("If
... the PTAB declares the challenged claims invalid, then any pending litigation based
on those invalid claims becomes moot.").
238 See note 230.
239 304 US 64 (1938).
240 See Sease, 70 ND L Rev at 790 (cited in note 156).
241 See Stoll, Comment, 79 U Cin L Rev at 1247-48 & n 52 (cited in note 150).
242 See Katherine F. Horvath, Comment, NBA v. Motorola: A Case for Federal
Preemption of Misappropriation?, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 461, 467 (1998).
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preemption, or (3) conflict preemption.243 Explicit preemption
arises when Congress defines, through express statutory lan-
guage, the extent to which its enactment preempts state law.244
Conflict preemption arises when there is a conflict between fed-
eral law and state law. Such a conflict exists when it is impossi-
ble for a private party to comply with both state and federal re-
quirements, or when state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.245 Finally, field preemption arises when state
law attempts to regulate conduct in a field that Congress in-
tends the federal government to occupy exclusively.246 In prac-
tice, these three preemption categories are not entirely distinct.
For example, state law that falls within a preempted field might
also conflict with federal law in that field.247
Federal patent law does not explicitly preempt joint-patent-
misappropriation claims because the text of the Patent Act does
not expressly exclude them.248 Whether federal patent law
preempts a state joint-patent-misappropriation claim under field
preemption or conflict preemption, however, is a question that
requires closer examination.
The issue of field preemption has previously arisen in the
patent law context. The early cases, often called the Sears-
Compco line of cases, held that the federal patent law indeed
preempts the field of state unfair competition law.249 In both
Sears, Roebuck & Co v Stiffel Co250 and Compco Corp v Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc,251 the defendants copied and marketed the plain-
tiffs' lighting fixtures.22 The plaintiffs sued, alleging patent in-
fringement under federal law and unfair competition under
Illinois law.253 The Supreme Court held that "[j]ust as a State
cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot,
243 See Hunter Douglas, Inc v Harmonic Design, Inc, 153 F3d 1318, 1332 (Fed
Cir 1998).
244 See English v General Electric Co, 496 US 72, 78-79 (1990).
245 See id at 79.
246 See id.
247 See id at 79 n 5.
248 See Hunter Douglas, 153 F3d at 1332 ("[Flederal patent law plainly does not
provide for explicit preemption.").
249 See Goodwin, Note, 43 Fordham L Rev at 242-43 (cited in note 151).
250 376 US 225 (1964) ("Sears").
251 376 US 234 (1964) ("Compco").
252 See Sears, 376 US at 225-26; Compco, 376 US at 234-35. See also Goodwin,
Note, 43 Fordham L Rev at 242-43 (cited in note 151).
253 See Sears, 376 US at 226; Compco, 376 US at 235.
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under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competi-
tion, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of
the federal patent laws."254 According to the Court, federal pa-
tent law's objective is to promote invention while preserving free
competition.255 Thus, "when an article is unprotected by a patent
.... state law may not forbid others [from] copy[ing] that arti-
cle."256 In other words, the Court essentially held that, if federal
intellectual property law does not protect an invention, then it is
in the public domain and therefore not entitled to protection un-
der state law. These two cases "left the states' common law of
misappropriation ... in doubt" and subject to preemption by
federal patent law because misappropriation is a common-law
unfair competition claim.257
In Kewanee, the Court clarified the extent to which states
may concurrently regulate trade in intellectual property that
would qualify for protection under the Patent Act but for a tech-
nical statutory infirmity.258 The defendants in Kewanee were
former employees of Harshaw Chemical Company, a manufac-
turer of synthetic crystals.259 The defendants left Harshaw and
formed Bicron Corporation, at which they produced the same
crystals.260 Kewanee Oil, Harshaw's parent company, sued
Bicron, alleging trade secret misappropriation.261 The Court held
that federal patent law did not preempt the state law governing
trade secret misappropriation.262 While Kewanee primarily con-
cerned trade secret misappropriation, the Court limited Sears
and Compco to situations in which state regulation "conflict[ed]"
or "clash[ed]" with the objectives of the patent law.263 Therefore,
while the Court left open the possibility that some misappropri-
ation claims may be conflict-preempted, it dismissed the conten-
tion that they are field-preempted.264
Much like trade secret misappropriation, other misappro-
priation claims are not field-preempted. As stated above, misap-
propriation is an unfair competition claim, and "there is no field
254 Sears, 376 US at 231.
255 Id at 230-31.
256 Compco, 376 US at 237.
257 Goodwin, Note, 43 Fordham L Rev at 243 (cited in note 151).
258 See Kewanee, 416 US at 491.
259 Id at 473.
260 Id.
261 Id at 473-74.
262 Kewanee, 416 US at 493.
263 Id at 479-80.
264 Id at 493.
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preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a sub-
stantial question of federal patent law.265 For example, in Gil-
son v Republic of Ireland,266 Gilson sued the defendants for
"using the plaintiff['s] patent rights.267 Gilson, however, had no
standing to sue for patent infringement because he had only a
nonexclusive license to use the patent.268 Instead, he claimed
that the defendants misappropriated his patent rights.269
Although the court determined that the defendant did not mis-
appropriate Gilson's patent rights, it first noted that Gilson's
complaint did not arise under the Patent Act because it was
grounded in tort.270 Even though the court did not base this con-
clusion on an explicit analysis of whether federal patent law
preempted state-law-patent-misappropriation claims, neither
did the court flag preemption as an issue.
Currently, there is no consensus among courts or scholars
about whether field preemption precludes patent owners from
bringing joint-patent-misappropriation claims-especially in
light of Enzo Biochem, Inc v Amersham PLC,271 which seems to
contradict Gilson.272 Enzo Biochem entered an agreement with
Amersham in which it allowed Amersham to market and dis-
tribute some of its patented products.273 However, Amersham
began selling some of Enzo's products without permission.274 En-
zo sued Amersham, alleging patent infringement and patent
misappropriation; both claims failed.275 Regarding the misappro-
priation claim, the court noted that "Enzo seeks only to protect
its patents from misappropriation"; thus, "its state-law claim for
unfair competition is preempted by federal patent law276 because
265 Hunter Douglas, 153 F3d at 1333.
266 787 F2d 655 (DC Cir 1986).
267 Id at 656.
268 Id (explaining that Gilson's patent was nonexclusive because he had been a joint
inventor of the patented product and the four inventors had assigned their patent to
their employer, who in turn gave Gilson a nonexclusive, royalty-free license under the
patent).
269 Id at 657-58.
270 Gilson, 787 F2d at 658.
271 981 F Supp 2d 217 (SDNY 2013).
272 Compare id at 226 ("[Enzo's] state-law claim for unfair competition is preempted
by federal patent law."), with Gilson, 787 F2d at 658 (stating that Gilson's claim was
based on tort and "[did] not arise under the patent laws").
273 Enzo Biochem, 981 F Supp 2d at 220.
274 Id at 220-21.
275 Id at 221-22. The court disposed of the patent infringement claim on summary
judgment in 2012. Id at 221.
276 Id at 226.
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"states cannot, under the guise of regulating unfair competition,
grant what is in effect patent protection.277 But the Supreme
Court has warned against such a broad reading of Sears.27s Oth-
er courts and commentators have as well.279
At the heart of Sears and Dow Chemical Co v Exxon Corp2s°
is the conclusion that, because there is a "strong federal policy
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent pro-
tection," state law may not restrict access to ideas that federal
law intentionally leaves in the public domain.281 Federal patent
law does not intentionally leave valid patents in the public
domain.282 Rather, federal patent law intends to exclude the pub-
lic from unrestricted use of inventions disclosed in valid patents
for a limited time.2s3 Therefore, joint-patent-misappropriation
claims will not upset the balance between preemptive federal-
rights concepts and the concept of public domain property. 28 4
Most successful misappropriation cases "have simply kept a
wrongdoer from engaging in clearly offensive, inequitable con-
duct beyond simple copying."285
Furthermore, joint patent misappropriation does not impli-
cate the concerns raised in Sears-Compco, which dealt with un-
patented inventions. Rather, the joint-patent-misappropriation
solution aims to protect the rights associated with valid patents.
The concept of public domain that appears in Sears-Compco
describes articles that are unprotected by federal patent law be-
cause (1) they have failed to meet the requirements for patenta-
bility, (2) they were granted patent protection but subsequently
277 Enzo Biochem, 981 F Supp 2d at 226, citing Sears, 376 US at 231.
278 See Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 489 US 141, 154 (1989) (rea-
soning that "the broadest reading of Sears would prohibit the States from regulating...
tortious appropriation," and warning that this extrapolation is "inappropriate").
279 See S. Stephen Hilmy, Note, Bonito Boats' Resurrection of the Preemption Con-
troversy: The Patent Leverage Charade and the Lanham Act "End Around" 69 Tex L Rev
729, 737-38 (1991) (noting that "[c]riticism of Sears-Compco had come not just from legal
scholars, but from virtually all quarters, including judges in the lower courts").
280 139 F3d 1470 (Fed Cir 1998).
281 Hilmy, Note, 69 Tex L Rev at 756 (cited in note 279), quoting Bonito Boats, 489
US at 168.
282 See Limelight, 134 S Ct at 2120 (acknowledging that permitting a would-be in-
fringer to evade liability by dividing performance of a method patent's steps with anoth-
er whom the defendant neither directs nor controls is an anomaly).
283 See Hilmy, Note, 69 Tex L Rev at 737 (cited in note 279), quoting Mine Safety
Appliances Co v Electric Storage Battery Co, 405 F2d 901, 902 n 2 (CCPA 1969) ("Patent
laws function only to keep things out of the public domain temporarily."). See also 35
USC § 154(a)(2).
284 See Sease, 70 ND L Rev at 805 (cited in note 156).
285 Id.
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lost it through expiry or invalidation, or (3) the owner of the ar-
ticle simply chose not to seek patent protection.26 In the joint-
infringement context, the patented article is indeed unprotected,
but not due to any of the reasons contemplated in Sears-Cormpco.
Patent law intends to protect the patented articles in joint-
infringement cases for a limited time. But for a statutory and
common-law loophole, joint infringers would be unable to avoid
patent infringement liability.287 Thus, federal patent law and
policy support the idea that federal patent law does not field-
preempt joint-patent-misappropriation claims.
Some courts have refused to decide field preemption issues,
preferring to apply conflict preemption instead. The Hunter
Douglas court rejected the "blunt tool of field preemption," pre-
ferring conflict preemption as a more precise means of determin-
ing which state law causes of action federal patent law
preempts.288 In doing so, the court raised three analytical points,
which the court in Mopex summarized as follows: (1) federal pa-
tent law and state unfair competition law regulate different
conduct-federal patent law seeks to reward and foster innova-
tion, while unfair competition law regulates commercial and
contractual relations; (2) "the fact that federal patent law and
state unfair competition law have 'long existed as distinct and
independent bodies of law.' counsels against field preemption;
and (3) since the boundaries of unfair competition law are un-
clear, conflict preemption is a better tool for examining whether
federal law preempts a state-law claim.289
Federal patent law does not conflict-preempt joint-patent-
misappropriation claims. Federal law conflict-preempts state-
law claims only when they "stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.290 In Rodime PLC v Seagate Technology, Inc,291 the
Federal Circuit set forth a test for determining whether a state-
law claim is conflict-preempted.292 The test provides that federal
286 See Hilmy, Note, 69 Tex L Rev at 748 (cited in note 279).
287 See Part II.A.
288 Hunter Douglas, 153 F3d at 1321, 1334-35 (considering the issue whether "fed-
eral patent law preempts state law causes of action prohibiting tortious activities in the
marketplace, when.., the plaintiff must prove that a United States patent is [ invalid
or unenforceable," in the context of motorized-window-blind patents).
289 Mopex, 2003 WL 715652 at *3, citing Hunter Douglas, 153 F3d at 1333-36.
290 Hunter Douglas, 153 F3d at 1332, quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67
(1941).
291 174 F3d 1294 (Fed Cir 1999).
292 See id at 1306.
1066 [82:1023
Joint Patent Misappropriation
patent law does not conflict-preempt state-law torts when the
tort action includes additional elements not found in the federal
patent law cause of action.293 Patent misappropriation involves
an underlying tort that is separate and distinct from patent in-
fringement, and the elements of patent infringement are mark-
edly different from those of patent misappropriation. Patent in-
fringement under § 271(a) requires that a single entity practice
each and every element of a patent claim.294 Patent misappro-
priation, on the other hand, requires: (1) the plaintiff to make "a
substantial investment of time, effort, and money into creating
the thing misappropriated"-the patent-such that the court
can characterize the patent as a kind of property right; (2) the
defendant to appropriate the patent "at little or no cost, such
that the court can characterize [the] defendant's actions as
'reaping where it has not sown'; and (3) that the defendant's
acts injure the plaintiff.295
By way of illustration, if an unauthorized person offered to
sell a patented product to the public, he would be liable for pa-
tent infringement.296 But if no one bought the product from him,
he would not be liable for patent misappropriation unless his
acts actually injured the patent owner in some way. Successful
misappropriation claims require actual injury, but successful pa-
tent infringement claims do not.297 On the other hand, if the sell-
er performed all but one element of a patent claim, and the buy-
er performed the remaining element, the seller and buyer may
have jointly misappropriated the patent-depending on their
scienter298-but the single-entity rule would shield them from in-
fringement liability. In such a case, entities could commit joint
patent misappropriation without committing any of the current
federal patent infringement violations. Thus, because a joint-
patent-misappropriation claim would not duplicate a federal
patent infringement claim, federal patent law would not conflict-
preempt a joint-patent-misappropriation claim.299
293 See Mopex, 2003 WL 715652 at *5, citing Rodime, 174 F3d at 1306.
294 See Part I.A.
295 Barnes, 9 NC J L & Tech at 174 (cited in note 152). See also Part III.A.
296 See 35 USC § 271(a).
297 See Barnes, 9 NC J L & Tech at 174 (cited in note 152).
298 See Part III.B.
299 See Mopex, 2003 WL 715652 at *5 ("[A] claim must be preempted [if] it is sym-
metrical with infringement and alleges nothing in addition to that required by the pa-
tent laws."); Rodime, 174 F3d at 1306 (explaining that state-law causes of action that
"require proof of additional elements not found in the patent law cause of action ... do
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Further, the Kewanee court offered three reasons for finding
that trade secret misappropriation is not conflict-preempted:
(1) the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by
another incentive to invent; (2) the policy that materials, once in
the public domain, must remain in the public domain is not in-
compatible with the existence of trade secret protection because
trade secrets are by definition not in the public domain; and
(3) there is no substantial risk that holders of patentable inven-
tions would not seek patents and rely on state protectioninstead.30
Although Kewanee dealt with trade secret misappropriation
claims rather than patent-misappropriation claims, the Court's
reasoning still suggests federal law does not conflict-preempt
joint-patent-misappropriation claims. First, the patents that a
joint-patent-misappropriation claim would protect are valid.
Thus, ensuring their protection when federal patent law fails to
do so would not disturb patent policy encouraging invention. To
the contrary, it would further incentivize invention. Permitting
unauthorized users to profit from valid patents may chill inter-
est in pursuing patents at all because obtaining a patent re-
quires significant investments of time and money. Alternatively,
trade secret protection might become more attractive to inven-
tors, because trade secret law encourages invention in areas
that patent law does not reach.301 Put another way, if the joint
patent infringement problem remains unresolved, inventors may
resort to using trade secrets to protect their inventions instead
of patents. Trade secrets, however, are vulnerable to reverse en-
gineering.302 And that risk could dissuade inventors from bring-
ing their unpatented inventions to market.
Second, like trade secrets, valid patents are not in the public
domain. In fact, patent law intends to keep them out of the
public domain for twenty years. 303 If a patent were invalid or the
inventor never obtained one, a court could decide that federal
law intends to leave the invention in the public domain, totally
excluding it from protection. That is not the case when the patent
not constitute an impermissible attempt to offer patent-like protection to subject matter
addressed by federal law").
300 See Kewanee, 416 US at 484-89.
301 See id at 485.
302 See id at 490.




is valid and patent law is functioning properly. Patent law aims
to protect valid patents.
Lastly, although the third Kewanee justification-that there
is no substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions
would rely on state protection instead of seeking patents-is de-
batable today because many inventors do choose to pursue other
forms of protection (such as trade secrets), it is also irrelevant
because both patent infringement and patent misappropriation
require patent ownership. Thus, joint-patent-misappropriation
claims would not discourage people from seeking patents. How-
ever, as stated above, federally preempting the joint misappro-
priation claim could incentivize inventors to pursue trade se-
crets instead of patents.
It is well established that state courts have authority to ad-
judicate patent questions, so long as the action itself does not
arise under federal patent law.304 In Dow Chemical, the Federal
Circuit ruled that Supreme Court precedent preempts only state
laws that seek to offer patent-like protection to intellectual
property that is inconsistent with the federal scheme.305 Indeed,
states are free to regulate the use of intellectual property in any
manner not inconsistent with federal law.306 Thus, state courts
should be free to adjudicate joint-patent-misappropriation
claims because, as explained above, not only are these claims
consistent with the federal patent law, but they also actually
promote its objectives.
4. Getting past preemption problems.
Given its potential viability, the joint-patent-misappropriation
solution raises the question: Why, if joint-patent-misappropriation
claims are available, have patent holders harmed by joint action
not brought them? Most likely because patent holders think that
such claims are preempted, and therefore futile, under the
Sears-Compco line of cases. 07 This is unsurprising given the con-
fusing commentary that followed those cases, which was "too often
304 See Dow Chemical, 139 F3d at 1475, citing Hathorn v Lovorn, 457 US 255, 266 n
18 (1982).
305 Dow Chemical, 139 F3d at 1474.
306 See id, citing Aronson v Quick Point Pencil Co, 440 US 257, 262 (1979).
307 See Ted D. Lee and Ann Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court Resolu-
tion of Patent, Trademark, or Copyright Disputes, 19 St Mary's L J 703, 704 (1988) (not-
ing that lawyers unfamiliar with patent law might mistakenly assume that patent
claims must be brought in federal court, rather than state court, because of preemption
concerns).
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simplistic, usually concluding either that the field [of unfair
competition] is totally preempted [by federal patent law] or that it
is left totally unpreempted."30 But the patent-misappropriation
concept is not so easily delineated-it lies in the gray area be-
tween "totally preempted" and "totally unpreempted."309 For ex-
ample, in many cases, if a patent is directly misappropriated, it
is also directly infringed. This relationship reflects a conflict be-
tween federal patent infringement and state-law patent misap-
propriation. Thus, federal patent law would conflict-preempt a
state-law direct patent-misappropriation claim. However, there
is no conflict between federal patent infringement and joint-
patent-misappropriation claims, with one exception-induced
patent misappropriation involving direction or control by one
joint actor. Generally, if a patent were jointly misappropriated,
it would not be infringed because a single entity did not practice
each and every element of the patent. That being the case, fed-
eral patent law would not conflict-preempt a state-law-joint-
patent-misappropriation claim. But if one joint actor served as a
mastermind and directed or controlled the conduct of the other
joint actors, the mastermind could be held liable for direct pa-
tent infringement, as the direct-and-control standard is an ex-
ception to the single-entity rule.310
Thus, preemption should be addressed on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Some courts and patent litigators, however, find it easier to
simply treat all patent-related disputes as preempted by federal
patent law.311 That approach is wrong.312 For example, in Dow
Chemical, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's holding
that federal patent law preempted state-law claims based on bad-
faith-patent-license enforcement. 313 And in Gunn v Minton,314 the
Supreme Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court's holding
that federal patent law preempted state legal malpractice claims
based on underlying patent matters.315 Finally, in Kewanee, the
38 Richard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law after
Kewanee, 42 Geo Wash L Rev 927, 929 (1974).
309 Id.
310 For a discussion of the direct-and-control standard, see Part I.A.2.
311 See, for example, Enzo Biochem, 981 F Supp 2d at 226.
312 See Gunn v Minton, 133 S Ct 1059, 1068 (2013), quoting New Marshall Engine
Co v Marshall Engine Co, 223 US 473, 478 (1912) ("The Federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases arising under the patent laws, but not of all questions in which a
patent may be the subject-matter of the controversy.").
313 Dow Chemical, 139 F3d at 1479.
314 133 S Ct 1059 (2013).
315 Id at 1068.
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Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding that federal
patent law preempted state trade secret misappropriation
claims because the trade secrets at issue were patentable.316
Overall, as far as objections to the joint-patent-
misappropriation solution go, federal preemption appears to be
the strongest. That is partially because the concept of federal
preemption is complicated as it relates to intellectual property
protection, and courts have provided inconsistent guidance. That
said, federal preemption does not disqualify joint patent misap-
propriation as a solution to the joint patent infringement prob-
lem. As one commentator noted, "misappropriation does serve a
useful purpose, but its use must be carefully balanced against
the preemptive federal right concepts embodied in patent ...
law. . . . Most successful misappropriation cases have not upset
this balance."'317 As this Comment establishes, joint-patent-
misappropriation claims do not offend the policy behind federal
preemption law, and such claims would resolve an important
and unsettled intellectual property issue.
This Part has detailed why the joint-patent-misappropriation
solution is consistent with the purpose behind federal patent law
preemptive rights-specifically, ensuring that property in the
public domain remains free for all to use. 318 To be sure, joint-
patent-misappropriation claims do not protect inventions that
are properly in the public domain. On the contrary, such claims
aim to protect only valid patents that are lost to the public do-
main through a loophole in the patent law. The three aforemen-
tioned objections to the joint-patent-misappropriation solution-
inapplicability of traditional tort theories, forum shopping, and
federal preemption-are plausible but ultimately unconvincing.
This is especially true because the relative upsides of the solu-
tion outweigh any downsides that dissenters might present
based on these objections. Thus, patent owners-when confront-
ed with a joint patent infringement issue-should bring joint-
patent-misappropriation claims.
316 Kewanee, 416 US at 493.
317 Sease, 70 ND L Rev at 805 (cited in note 156).
318 See id.
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CONCLUSION
In essence, the joint-patent-misappropriation solution is an
outside-the-box approach to fixing an unintentional loophole in
the patent law. Such gaps are rare because federal patent law is
well drafted. Consequently, the fact that litigants have not
brought many joint-patent-misappropriation claims is not an in-
dication that this cause of action is inappropriate. Rather, it
simply reflects uncertainty. This Comment argues that the
joint-patent-misappropriation cause of action can resolve the
joint-infringement conundrum. Indeed, once courts realize that
federal patent law does not preempt state-law-joint-patent-
misappropriation claims, patent owners will become less vulner-
able to the exploits of joint infringers.
